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On October 10, 2014, the Oklahoma State Penitentiary opened its doors 
to the media to reveal a new state-of-the-art death chamber and announced 
that it had created an efficient execution facility. To complement the 
improvements to the prison architecture and the punishment technology, the 
Oklahoma legislature amended the state’s execution protocol to formulate 
effective procedures delineating what it considered appropriate 
pharmacology to render a constitutional execution. This advance in design 
and regulation, however, has not prevented subsequent maladministration 
by various members of the Department of Corrections’ execution teams. On 
January 16, 2015, Charles Warner was executed with the prison receiving 
and using the wrong drugs. On October 16, 2015, due to further 
operational mistakes, the District Court for the Western District of 
Oklahoma declared Richard Glossip’s case to be administratively closed. 
                                                                                                                 
 * Professor of Human Rights, Director of the BCU Centre for Human Rights, School 
of Law, Birmingham City University, The Curzon Building, 4 Cardigan Street, Birmingham, 
B4 7BD; Ph.D. (Law)., Warwick University 2008; LL.M., Warwick University 2001; LL.B., 
(Hons) Birmingham City University 1997. This is an expanded version of the First Inaugural 
lecture for the BCU Professor of Human Rights, BCU School of Law, November 26, 2016. I 
would like to thank the included for comments on previous drafts and for conversations on 
the death penalty and pharmacological science which have informed this article: Marélize 
Yorke, Randall Coyne, Deborah Denno, Robin Konrad, Susan Otto, Kim Ludwig, Roger 
Hood, Carolyn Hoyle, Mark George, Jo Cecil, Sarah Cooper, Hannah Gorman, Haydn 
Davies, Anne Richardson Oakes, and Alice Storey. Thank you also for the fantastic editorial 
comments by Michael Waters, Michael Nash, and Simon Bright, members of the Oklahoma 
Law Review. All errors remain mine. 
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To investigate these systematic failings, a Multicounty Grand Jury was 
convened and it considered evidence from stakeholders in the execution 
process. Its Interim Report provided damning findings, which demonstrate 
that the death penalty is still struggling for institutional legitimacy. The 
continuation of botched executions, inappropriate alterations to the 
protocol, and the claims of punishment experimentation on non-consenting 
human subjects is contributing to a growing lack of confidence that 
Oklahoma can maintain a humane form of capital punishment through 
lethal injection.  
These unacceptable circumstances occurred primarily as a result of the 
uncomfortable relationship between the purported “science” of lethal 
injection and the “constitutional law” of lethal injection, and therefore a 
clear interpretation of the intellectual interplay of these two disciplines is 
required. Both the procedural review parameters provided by the principles 
of comity and finality, and the scientific methodologies of atomism and 
holism for determining the epistemology of the pharmacology, will prove 
illuminating. There are compelling questions concerning whether the 
adjudicative process can produce sound reasoning for assessing the death 
penalty. We are left with the situation in which there are still, and perhaps 
always will be, ardent circumstances challenging the constitutionality of 
Oklahoma’s lethal injection.  
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 “We only prepare what we regard as the normal dose, Socrates.” 
“[I]t is a long time since we had a visitor . . . who could give us 
any definite information, except that he was executed by 
drinking hemlock; nobody could tell us anything more than 
that.” 
— Phaedo, Plato, The Last Days of Socrates**  
I. Introduction 
There is great pressure1 placed upon the capital judicial process.2 Each 
participant in the death penalty feels the extreme burden of their task, be it 
                                                                                                                 
 **  PLATO, THE LAST DAYS OF SOCRATES: EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO AND PHAEDO 
198, 116 (Hugh Tredennick & Harold Tarrant trans., 2003). 
 1. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L. J. 1601, 1601 (1986). 
Robert Cover cogently discusses the agonism inherent within the adjudicative method, 
saying that “[l]egal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death,” that “[l]egal 
interpretative acts signal and occasion the imposition of violence upon others,” and, on the 
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the judge, the attorneys, the victims’ families, the Office of the Governor, 
the Department of Corrections staff, police officers, witnesses, journalists, 
or the wider interested communities (for example, retentionist3 and 
abolitionist4 organizations). It is perhaps evident that this pressure is most 
acute in the build-up to, and in the administration of, an execution. There is 
systematic scrutiny being applied to the actions of the execution teams5 
(with an emphasis on the Restraint Team, IV Team, and Special Operations 
Team6), the efficacy of the execution equipment, and the changing array of 
                                                                                                                 
death penalty, that “[t]he questions of whether the death sentence is constitutionally 
permissible and, if it is, whether to impose it, are among the most difficult problems a judge 
encounters” because “in capital punishment the action or deed is extreme and irrevocable, 
there is pressure placed upon the word.” Id. at 1601, 1622 (footnote omitted).  
 2. In the Elkouri Inaugural Lecture on October 9, 2005, Professor Randall Coyne 
effectively demonstrated that the pressure that is placed upon Oklahoma’s capital judicial 
system rendered unjust capital sentences for Adolph Munson, Ronald Williamson, and 
Robert Miller. Randall Coyne, Dead Wrong in Oklahoma, 42 TULSA L. REV. 209, 240 
(2006). To emphasize the injustice, Coyne quoted the dissent of Justice Blackmun in Callins 
v. Collins: “[T]he basic question—does the system accurately and consistently determine 
which defendants ‘deserve’ to die?—can not be answered in the affirmative.” Id. (quoting 
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994)) (Blackman, J., dissenting).  
 3. E.g., JUSTICE FOR ALL, http://www.jfa.net/ (last updated Oct. 28, 2011); PRO-DEATH 
PENALTY.COM http://www.prodeathpenalty.com/ (last updated Oct. 12, 2014). 
 4. E.g., AMICUS, http://www.amicus-alj.org/ (last visited May 12, 2017); Cornell Law 
School: Death Penalty Project, CORNELL L. SCH., http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/ 
research/death-penalty-project/ (last visited May 12, 2017); Death Penalty, AMNESTY INT’L, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/death-penalty/ (last visited May 12, 2017); Death 
Penalty, REPRIEVE, http://www.reprieve.org.uk/topic/death-penalty/ (last visited May 12, 
2017); DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ (last visited May 12, 
2017); MURDER VICTIMS’ FAMILIES FOR RECONCILIATION, http://www.mvfr.org/ (last visited 
May 12, 2017); OKLA. COALITION TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY, http://okcadp.org/ (last 
visited May 12, 2017).  
 5. See, e.g., Interim Report Number 14 of the Grand Jury, In re Multicounty Grand 
Jury, State of Oklahoma, Case No. SCAD-2014-70, at 100 (Okla. May 19, 2016); Jon 
Yorke, Glossip v Gross: Taking Up Justice Breyer’s Call to Question the Death Penalty, 
OXFORD HUM. RTS. HUB: BLOG, (July 30, 2015), http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/glossip-v-gross-
taking-up-justice-breyers-call-to-question-the-death-penalty/; Richard Glossip: Oklahoma 
Halts Execution ‘to Check Drugs,’ BBC NEWS (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-us-canada-34405979.  
 6. See Okla. Dep’t of Corrections, Execution of Offenders Sentenced to Death, 
Operations Memorandum No. OP-040301 5-9 (June 30, 2015), http://www.ok.gov/doc/ 
documents/op040301.pdf. Section IV records the following teams in Oklahoma’s execution 
procedures: (a) Command Team; (b) H Unit Section Teams-Restraint Team, Special 
Operations Team; (c) Intravenous Team; (d) Maintenance Response Team; (e) Critical 
Incident Management Team; (f) Traffic Control Team; (g) Witness Escort Teams; and (h) 
Victim Services Team. Id.; see, e.g., Interim Report Number 14 of the Grand Jury, In re 
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pharmacological substances used in lethal injection. This extensive 
evaluation has revealed, in the words of Deborah Denno, that there is 
currently a “lethal injection chaos”7 across the death penalty states, and 
recent events have demonstrated that the State of Oklahoma plays an 
unenviable role in the frantic practical and procedural vicissitudes that are 
occurring.  
The source of the chaos in Oklahoma is found in the interaction between 
the different actors determining the purported “science” of lethal injection8 
and the “constitutional law” of lethal injection.9 This interaction creates a 
“science-litigation interface”10 within which law as an institution and 
science as an institution are struggling for legitimacy.11 The resultant 
procedural friction occasions the question as to whether the judicial 
proceedings have revealed the science of lethal injection to the best of our 
knowledge. There needs to be a clear articulation that the scientific 
findings, which the litigation has cast a lens upon, are not a mere assertion 
and affirmation of state policy-relevant science, or an illegitimate reduction 
of the science in an expression of reductio ad absurdum (Latin for, 
“reduction to absurdity”). What the courts need to provide is a transparent 
and accurate reflection of the pharmacological properties and biological 
effects of the execution drugs.12 Ultimately, Oklahoma’s capital judicial 
                                                                                                                 
Multicounty Grand Jury, State of Oklahoma, Case No. SCAD-2014-70, at 100 (Okla. May 
19, 2016).  
 7. Deborah W. Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos Post-Baze, 102 GEO. L.J. 1331, 1335 
(2014) (discussing the evolution of pharmacological issues and the state’s attempts to ensure 
a constitutional death penalty) (“There have been more changes in lethal injection protocols 
during the past five years than there have been in the last three decades.”).  
 8. Deborah M. Hussey Freeland, Speaking Science to Law, 25 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. 
REV. 289, 327 (2013) (arguing that “[e]ven where a judge is an expert with regard to the 
subject of scientific testimony, the judge may take the structure of the two-party adversarial 
litigation process for granted, and forget that the presentation of scientific expertise by both 
sides will likely give the jury or even the judge himself the impression that science is 
agnostic on the matter”).  
 9. See Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling 
Paradox Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About 
Us, 63 OHIO STATE L.J. 63 (2002).  
 10. Sanne H. Knudsen, Adversarial Science, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1503, 1507 (2015).  
 11. Sheila Jasanoff, Just Evidence: The Limits of Science in the Legal Process, 34 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 328, 330, 339, (2006) (arguing that law and science form a “social 
enterprise” for determining questions of method and data within the adjudicative process and 
that “science can deliver insights into matters otherwise hidden from judicial inquiry”).  
 12. See generally Shelia S. Jasanoff, Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science, 
17 SOC. STUD. SCI. 195 (1987).  
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process needs to allow science to speak to law,13 and then listen and act 
reasonably. It is questionable whether this has hitherto occurred.  
This article uses the Warner-Glossip14 litigation (specifically from 2014-
2016) as a case study to reveal the pressure and resultant human error15 
within Oklahoma’s capital judicial process. To provide an interpretative 
lens for this assessment, a reading is offered of how the State has adopted 
(a) pharmacological science for the execution protocol through the 
procedures created by the “principle of comity”16 in the establishment of 
reciprocal federal-state governmental and adjudicative norms and (b) the 
“doctrine of finality”17 via the mechanisms for the closure of proceedings 
and the ultimate implementation of the punishment. At issue is the extent to 
which Oklahoma’s government legitimately utilizes comity and finality, 
thus contributing to an effective and efficient capital judicial system or the 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See generally Hussy Freeland, supra note 8 (providing useful insights into this 
narrative and discourse of science in the courtroom). 
 14. Charles Frederick Warner was convicted of the 1997 brutal rape and murder of 
eleven-month-old Adrianna Waller. Warner v. State, 2006 OK CR 40, ¶¶ 1-2, 144 P.3d 838, 
856. Richard Eugene Glossip was sentenced to death for the commission of the 1997 murder 
of Barry Van Treese. Glossip v. State, 2001 OK CR 21, ¶¶ 1-5, 29 P.3d 597, 598-99. There 
are substantial grounds for arguing that Glossip is innocent of this crime. See Richard 
Glossip Is Innocent, MINISTRY AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY, http://www. 
sisterhelen.org/richard (last visited May 12, 2017) (Sister Helen Prejean's campaign); 
RICHARD E. GLOSSIP, http://www.richardeglossip.com/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2017) (Richard 
Glossip's website); see also Glossip v. State, 2007 OK CR 12, 157 P.3d 143 (discussing the 
case’s history). The question of Glossip’s culpability is outside of the scope of this article, 
but, considering the evidence in the case, this author is also convinced that beyond a 
reasonable doubt Glossip is innocent.  
 15. The Committee on Quality of Health Care in America has published detailed 
examples of human error in the American health care system and concludes that “[h]ealth 
care is not as safe as it should be. A substantial body of evidence points to medical errors as 
a leading cause of death and injury.” COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., TO ERR IS 
HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 26 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000). In 
studying human error, James Reason observed:  
Not only must more effective methods of predicting and reducing dangerous 
errors emerge from a better understanding of mental processes, it has also 
become increasingly apparent that such theorising, if it is to provide an 
adequate picture of cognitive control processes, must explain not only correct 
performance, but also the more predictable varieties of human fallibility.  
JAMES REASON, HUMAN ERROR 1 (1990). 
 16. See generally Gil Seinfeld, Reflections on Comity in the Law of American 
Federalism, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1309 (2015). 
 17. See generally Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus 
for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963) (discussing the taxonomy of the doctrine 
of finality to facilitate effective legal process).  
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revealing under what circumstances these principles are asymmetrically 
applied and thus engender politico-legal problems.18 In assessing the death 
penalty, the comity-finality relationship is not merely expressed as a 
normative contingency, in that once comity has been completed the finality 
of an execution can automatically ensue. It is not that simple. This 
investigation aims to reveal that the two principles can interact to produce 
complex outcomes that do not necessarily facilitate a facially constitutional 
punishment, and this has been evident in Oklahoma, particularly in the 
procedure and process of lethal injection.  
Part II of this article outlines the application of the principles of comity 
and finality within the architecture of American federalism. The general 
discourses on comity and finality provide interpretive methodologies for 
uncovering the current turbulence within Oklahoma’s lethal injection 
protocol. These adjudicative mechanisms are then utilized to accommodate 
scientific methodologies for the interpretation of the biological effects of 
the pharmacological substances used in the executions. Part III analyzes the 
role of the judge as “scientific gatekeeper.”19 The judicial guidance for 
assessing the presentation of expert testimony within the courtroom is set 
out, and the importance of the judge’s understanding the technical 
interpretive methodologies of atomism (viewing scientific issues in a 
confined analysis)20 and holism (placing a scientific issue on a horizon of 
interpretation with other relevant variables)21 is revealed. A frisson occurs 
in the identification of the appropriate methodology for the assessment of 
pharmacology to reveal whether Oklahoma’s statute functions in the way 
that the State claims.  
Following the discussion of these methodologies, the article then reviews 
state preparations and implementation of the execution protocol. Part IV 
deconstructs the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma’s 
ruling in Warner v. Gross,22 which considered Oklahoma’s use of 
                                                                                                                 
 18. See, e.g., Andrew Chongseh Kim, Beyond Finality: How Making Criminal 
Judgments Less Final Can Further the “Interests of Finality,” 2013 UTAH L. REV. 561; Lee 
Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 443 (2007); 
JoAnn Lee, Note, An Empirical Analysis of Habeas Corpus: The Impact of Teague v. Lane 
and the Anti-Terrorism and Death Penalty Act on Habeas Petition Success Rates and 
Judicial Efficiency, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 665 (2006). 
 19. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). 
 20. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Atomism, Holism, and the Judicial Assessment of Evidence, 60 
UCLA L. REV. 1524, 1527 (2013). 
 21. Id.  
 22. Warner v. Gross, No. CIV-14-665-F, 2014 WL 7671680 (W.D. Okla. 2014), aff'd, 
776 F.3d 721 (10th Cir. 2015), aff'd sub nom. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).  
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midazolam23 as an anesthetic in lethal injection. During the evidentiary 
hearing, the parties presented conflicting expert testimony on the 
fundamental question of whether midazolam can induce and maintain a 
surgical plane of anesthesia during the execution. Of interpretive 
importance is the necessity for the court not to confine reasonable and 
significant bodies of scientific opinion but instead to provide a transparent 
and even-handed adjudication. It is argued, however, that an unjustified 
confining judgment was handed down through a selective use of the 
science. Part V outlines the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s 
affirmation of the district court judgment.24 It appears apparent that 
restrictive, adjudicative, techniques were repeated in the appeal to affirm 
the State’s use of midazolam. It becomes disputable whether the Tenth 
Circuit’s self-reflective assessment of the sufficiency of the scientific 
scrutiny stands up to sound qualitative and quantitative methodology.  
The majority and dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court in Glossip v. 
Gross25 regarding the science and logistics of Oklahoma’s execution 
protocol are reviewed in Part VI. Fundamental questions of the burden of 
proof, the extent to which comity has been observed, the promotion of 
atomism over holism concerning expert scientific testimony, and the 
shadow of finality over the process, reveal hidden truths concerning the 
interpretative and adjudicative mechanisms for the reducing and packaging 
of sound pharmacology to promote quixotic state policy outcomes. It 
appears that the Supreme Court failed to adhere to sound scientific 
principles and thus engendered a denial of the petitioner’s constitutional 
rights. Part VII provides a commentary on the post-Glossip issues. 
Following the imprudent confidence of the district court—and the affirming 
judgments of the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court—for declaring the 
effectiveness of Oklahoma’s new execution protocol, a damning further 
example of human error occurred resulting in Glossip’s execution being 
stayed and the proceedings being administratively closed.26 The resultant 
Multicounty Grand Jury investigations into the opportunities for negligence 
within Oklahoma’s execution protocol uncovers a significant array of 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Midazolam was first synthesized in 1976 and it belongs to the class of drugs known 
as benzodiazepines. J.G. Reves et al., Midazolam: Pharmacology and Uses, 62 
ANESTHESIOLOGY 310, 310 (1985).  
 24. Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721 (10th Cir.), aff'd sub nom. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. 
Ct. 2726 (2015). 
 25. 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).  
 26. Joint Stipulation for Administrative Closing of Case, Glossip v. Gross, Case No. 
CIV-14-665-F (W.D. Okla. Oct. 16, 2015).  
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reprimand-worthy mistakes in both the execution of Charles Warner and in 
the preparations for the execution of Richard Glossip. Part VIII concludes 
by questioning whether there will always be irredeemable vicissitudes 
within the execution protocol and considers whether it is now evidently 
futile to keep tinkering with Oklahoma’s machinery of death. It seems clear 
that it is now time to banish the punishment to the state’s annals of history.  
II. Comity, Finality, and the Capital Judicial Process  
A. Comity 
Comity is a principle of international law for maintaining 
intergovernmental relationships27 in a reciprocal procedural recognition of 
national legislation, judicial decisions, and other interests represented 
within bilateral and multilateral communications.28 This principle has been 
used to facilitate a political and legal courtesy within the architecture of 
American federalism, and it promotes cooperative jurisdictional 
competencies. Whilst it is clear that a procedural hierarchy is created, the 
balance of the powers and responsibilities between the state and the federal 
government has become a sensitive, symbiotic, manifestation. Of relevance 
to this study, this includes the power of, and the responsibility for, 
administering punishment. At the apex is the Supremacy Clause of Article 
                                                                                                                 
 27. See Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 
543 n.27 (1987) (“Comity refers to the spirit of cooperation in which a domestic tribunal 
approaches the resolution of cases touching the laws and interests of other sovereign 
states.”); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (“The extent to which the law of one 
nation . . . shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation, depends upon 
what our greatest jurists have been content to call ‘the comity of nations.’”); United States ex 
rel. Trantino v. Hatrack, 563 F.2d 86, 103 (3d Cir. 1977).  
 28. See generally Paolo G. Carozza, “My Friend Is a Stranger”: The Death Penalty and 
the Global Ius Commune of Human Rights, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2003) (providing an 
informative discussion on transnational adjudicative dialogue). Whilst it is true to state that 
the United States promotes comity of nations as a general principle of international law, it is 
significant for the theme of this article to note the theory of “American exceptionalism” in 
the application of the death penalty is increasing pulling America’s penological practice 
outside the margins of civilized punishment. See generally Carol S. Steiker, Capital 
Punishment and American Exceptionalism, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 57 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF 
AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2004); David Garland, Capital Punishment and American 
Culture, 7 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 347 (2005); James Q. Whitman, Response to Garland, 7 
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 389, 395 (2005); Franklin E. Zimring, Path Dependence, Culture and 
State-Level Execution Policy: A Reply to David Garland, 7 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 377 
(2005). 
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IV of the U.S. Constitution,29 which prohibits state law that conflicts with 
federal law, and in the event of a conflict, state law must yield to federal 
law.30 The Supremacy Clause is initiated when the state attempts to 
“transcend [its] powers,”31 and up to this point the federal government 
allows state jurisdictional competence to rectify any unconstitutional issues. 
Concerning this competency evaluation, Randall Coyne and Lyn Entzeroth 
assert that “[c]omity dictates that the state should have an opportunity to 
correct errors within its judicial system”32 before being subject to the 
scrutiny of the federal government.33 In Ex parte Royall, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 29. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 30. The Supremacy Clause, however, typically applies only where an “act of Congress 
fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of the State.” Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 
501, 533 (1912). 
 31. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) (laying out the federal 
framework which ensures “State Legislatures . . . do not transcend their powers,” and stating 
that if a state law “interfere[s] with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress, made in 
pursuance of the constitution . . . . [i]n every such case, the act of Congress . . . is supreme; 
and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must 
yield to it”).  
 32. RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS 816 (4th ed. 2012) (noting that the “exhaustion requirement reflects the policies of 
comity and federalism between the state and federal governments”). Coyne and Entzeroth 
cite Picard v. Connor, in which the Supreme Court stated that “it would be unseemly in our 
dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction 
without an opportunity for the state courts to correct a constitutional violation.” Id. (quoting 
Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). In criminal proceedings, if a prisoner contends 
that following state comity review that the state is still in violation of federal law the process 
for relief in the filing of a writ of habeas corpus helps to ensure that “no one is held in 
custody in either state or federal prison whose conviction or sentence was obtained or 
otherwise imposed in violation of the federal Constitution or federal law.” Lyn Entzeroth, 
Federal Habeas Review of Death Sentences, Where We Are Now?: A Review of Wiggins v. 
Smith and Miller-el v. Cockrell, 39 TULSA L. REV. 49, 51 (2003).  
 33. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1886); COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 32, 
at 809 (stating that Ex parte Royall was “a judicially crafted limitation on the ability of 
federal courts to hear certain claims raised by state prisoners”). An adjudicative issue is not 
ripe for the federal courts to consider unless the state has had a full opportunity to rectify any 
unconstitutional issues, and Laurence Tribe noted that this juridico-political relationship was 
designed to “protect[] the integrity of state law from potentially erroneous or gratuitously 
intrusive federal judicial scrutiny.” LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-
29, at 573 (3d ed. 2000).  
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provided for the federal-state relationship regarding habeas corpus 
proceedings and formulated the exhaustion of state remedies requirement 
before federal intervention.34 This exhaustive principle has subsequently 
been codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)-(d), which legislatively demarcates 
jurisdictional competencies.35 Comity review issues include, inter alia (a) 
the abstention doctrine, which provides jurisdictional competence for the 
primacy of state law before federal intervention;36 (b) the doctrine of 
adequate and independent state grounds, which allows for antecedent state 
decisions that “adequately” support the state dismissal of federal claims, 
and which are demonstrated to be “independent” of federal law;37 (c) the 
jurisprudence of preemption, which is recognized above in the Supremacy 
Clause, in which the Supreme Court has affirmed state laws that conflict 
                                                                                                                 
 34. 117 U.S. at 250-53. 
 35. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)-(c) (2012). The section states:  
 (b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it 
appears that—  
 (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of 
the State; or  
 (B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or  
 (ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the 
rights of the applicant.  
 (2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, 
notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in 
the courts of the State.  
 (3) A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement 
or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through 
counsel, expressly waives the requirement.  
 (c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies 
available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has 
the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the 
question presented. 
Id. (see infra. 561, as 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is known as the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act 1998).  
 36. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 
(1943); Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (for the principle of 
abstention). 
 37. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (for the doctrine of adequate and 
independent state grounds); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Murdock v. 
City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874) (for the primacy of state law).  
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with federal law are “without effect;”38 and (d) the circumstances raised 
within habeas corpus appeals.39 
Criminal justice proceedings should maintain a careful balancing of the 
powers and interests of the national government, state government, and the 
individual, and this is also reflected within the capital judicial process.40 
Focusing upon the death penalty, the State and the petitioner use the 
principle of comity to ensure that there is fairness in the proceedings, 
equality of arms, and due process of law.41 The realization of the federal-
state relationship, however, is assessed on a variable, contingent basis: in 
some circumstances, the federal government provides the scope for the 
states to determine issues individually,42 and in other examples, the 
evolution of the law becomes an assessment of the rates of change/lack of 
change in state legislation across the Union.43 In the application of this 
contingency, the capital judicial system has adopted the “language of 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516-18 (1992); Maryland v. 
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) 
(for the jurisprudence of preemption).  
 39. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(citations omitted) (stating that within the national review structure the Supreme Court 
maintains the “federal balance through judicial exposition of doctrines such as abstention, 
the rules for determining the primacy of state law, the doctrine of adequate and independent 
state grounds, the whole jurisprudence of preemption, and many of the rules governing our 
habeas jurisprudence” (internal citations omitted)); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 
722 (1991); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S 467 (1991) (for the rules governing habeas corpus).  
 40. David Gottlieb & Randall Coyne, Habeas Corpus Practice in State and Federal 
Courts, 31 N.M. L. REV. 201, 201 (2001) (noting that the writ of habeas corpus under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254 has “retained a significant amount of vitality in death penalty cases”).  
 41. See generally Joseph Blocher, The Death Penalty and the Fifth Amendment, 111 
NW. U. L. REV. 275 (2016); Eric M. Freedman, Giarratano Is a Scarecrow: The Right to 
Counsel in State Capital Postconviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1079 (2006). 
 42. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (an example of the assessment of 
quality of counsel in state cases); Entzeroth, supra note 32.  
 43. For the assessment of the rate of the change of state legislation for the categorical 
exemption to the death penalty, see, for example, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312-13 
(2002). For the rate of change—in states adopting legislation to abolish the death penalty for 
people suffering from mental retardation—and Justice Steven’s observation on the passage 
of bills in selected states, see id. at 314-15. For the rate of change—in state law on juvenile 
capital offences—and Justice Kennedy’s observations on the changes, see Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005). For a discussion on how the rate of change in state 
legislation can contribute to the national abolition of the death penalty see Brian Daniel 
Anderson, Comment, Roper v. Simmons: How the Supreme Court of the United States Has 
Established the Framework for Judicial Abolition of the Death Penalty in the United States, 
37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 221, 229-33 (2011).  
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experimentation”44 and the courts have discerned the states as being 
“laboratories” to determine constitutional questions.45 The usefulness of the 
analogy of the “laboratory” was identified by Justice Stevens in his 
memorandum respecting the denial of certiorari in Lackey v. Texas.46 In 
considering the constitutionality of a prolonged stay on death row, which in 
1995 was a “novel issue,” he held that new adjudicative circumstances will 
permit the states to “serve as laboratories in which the [length of stay on 
death row] receives further study before it is addressed by [the Supreme 
Court].”47 Justice Thomas, however, argued that Justice Stevens’s invitation 
for the states to serve as “laboratories” was already completed.48 Justice 
Breyer then rebutted this claim, stating that “although the experiment may 
have begun, it is hardly evident that we ‘should consider the experiment 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Justice Kennedy stated in United States v. Lopez, “the theory and utility of our 
federalism are revealed, for the States may perform their role as laboratories for 
experimentation to devise various solutions when the best solution is far from clear.” 514 
U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING 
ORIGINALISM 170 (2011) (discussing experimentation in the federalism framework) (“We 
should take the language of experimentation seriously rather than as a rhetorical excuse for 
nonregulation or as a way to resist the application of federal constitutional rights. 
Experiments should be encouraged if they work to the benefit of the entire nation. But if 
these are genuine experiments, experiments generally end at some point and the results are 
tabulated; somebody has to decide whether the experiment is a success or a failure, and, if a 
success, adopt best practices nationwide.”); Harrison Blythe, Comment, “Laboratories of 
Democracy” or “Machinery of Death”? The Story of Lethal Injection Secrecy and a Call to 
the Supreme Court for Intervention, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1269 (2015); Abbe R. Gluck, 
The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the 
New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010); Glen Staszewski, The Dumbing 
Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 209 (2015).  
 45. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 326 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (observing that the death 
penalty is primarily determined “through the workings of normal democratic processes in the 
laboratories of the States”). 
 46. 514 U.S. 1045 (1995).  
 47. Id. at 1047 (citing McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983)). “Petitioner's 
claim, with its legal complexity and its potential for far-reaching consequences, seems an 
ideal example of one which would benefit from such further study.” Id. 
 48. In Knight v. Florida, 120 S. Ct. 459, 461 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) (Justice 
Thomas argued that Justice Stevens’s invitation to state and lower courts to serve as 
“laboratories” in which the viability of this claim could receive further study has occurred, 
and to prove his argument, he cited a large corpus of cases: White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432 
(5th Cir. 1996); Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025 (10th Cir. 1995); Ex parte Bush, 695 So.2d 
138 (Ala. 1997); State v. Schackart, 947 P.2d 315 (Ariz. 1997); People v. Frye, 959 P.2d 183 
(Cal. 1998); People v. Massie, 967 P.2d 29 (Cal. 1998); State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272 
(Mont. 199*6); Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).  
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concluded.’”49 The disagreement on this aspect of the review of the death 
penalty means that the comity issues are ongoing.50 Viewing this interaction 
between the Supreme Court Justices, the various aspects of the state 
experiment with the death penalty can be interpreted as being a soluble 
comity process of state policy and practice, state adjudication, and federal 
assessment of the outcome(s).  
Comity interests advanced by the states include (a) the procedure of the 
capital judicial process to determine guilt or innocence, and if the defendant 
is found guilty, the appropriateness of the sentence; and then (b) the various 
components of the implementation of the punishment—from the 
physiological and psychological impact of incarceration on death row 
through to the preparations, adopted process, and method selected for an 
execution. On the procedural issues, the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by 
the Supreme Court focuses particularly on the Fifth Amendment, which 
provides for the possibility of the capital judicial process;51 the Sixth 
Amendment, which guarantees assistance of counsel in death penalty 
cases;52 the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits punishment that 
constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment;”53 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which provides for “equal protection of the laws.”54 However, 
the judicial assessment is not confined to the federal review of a state’s 
observance of these amendments, as the adjudication also encompasses 
state and federal consideration of international law.  
The American federal architecture adopts mechanisms for discerning the 
extent to which the state provides to foreign nationals, who are brought 
within the capital judicial process, the right of access to their consular under 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Knight, 120 S. Ct. at 465 (Breyer., J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 50. See Valle v. Florida, 564 U.S. 1067 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 51. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of 
War or public danger . . . .”).  
 52. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
Witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and 
to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.”). 
 53. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
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Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (hereinafter 
“VCCR”).55 Following the International Court of Justice’s decision in 
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals v. the United States,56 President 
George W. Bush withdrew the United States from the Optional Protocol of 
the VCCR.57 This was an attempt to prevent international review of 
domestic cases involving foreign nationals. The action prima facie nullified 
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to hear cases brought by 
the Member States of foreign nationals incarcerated on death row in the 
United States.58 Consistent with this executive action, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Section one of Article 36 reads: 
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to 
nationals of the sending State:  
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the 
sending State and to have access to them. . . .;  
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, 
without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its 
consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to 
prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. 
Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person 
arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the 
said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the 
person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph; 
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending 
State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond 
with him and to arrange for his legal representation. . . . 
U.N. Conference on Consular Relations, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36, 
§ 1, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (Apr. 24, 1963). 
 56. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). 
 57. See John Quigley, The United States’ Withdrawal from International Court of 
Justice Jurisdiction in Consular Cases: Reasons and Consequences, 19 DUKE. J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 263, 264-71 (2009).  
 58. Whilst in a normative application of the status of international conventions via 
Member State ratification, reservations, and revocation, it could be argued that the United 
States has severed the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. However, under the 
Charter of the United Nations, it appears that the U.S. is still bound to adhere to the 
judgments of the I.C.J. as Article 94 states:  
 1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the 
decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.  
 2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it 
under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to 
the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make 
recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the 
judgment.  
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has denied it possesses jurisdictional competence to affirm the application 
of the VCCR as an expression of federal law across the Union.59 Even so, 
some state courts have assessed the justifiable reach of Article 36. For 
example, in Torres v. Oklahoma,60 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals held that it was appropriate to allow for an evidentiary hearing to 
consider whether the petitioner’s VCCR rights applied to the capital judicial 
process in the state.61 In Gutierrez v. Nevada, the Nevada Supreme Court 
held that Article 36 applied to provide an adequate interpreter during court 
proceedings.62 As such, the states adhere to Congress’ treaty signing 
powers (and thus, authority) under Article II, Section 2 of the 
Constitution,63 but in an application of state comity, there are examples that 
the states themselves will consider the standards of international law.  
Having reviewed selected wider factors of jurisdictional competence, this 
focus on the comity investigation now presents the narrowed considerations 
of state capital adjudicative processes and the use of punishment 
technologies. The Supreme Court held that the death penalty is to be 
reserved for the “worst of the worst”64 criminal and that capital defendants 
and death row inmates need to be clearly classified via the Court’s 
“narrowing jurisprudence, which seeks to ensure that only the most 
                                                                                                                 
See also Michael J. Glennon & Robert D. Sloane, The Sad, Quiet Death of Missouri v. 
Holland: How Bond Hobbled the Treaty Power, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. 51, 98 (2016) 
(discussing this application of international law). 
 59. See Medellin v. Texas, 554 U.S. 759, 759-60 (2008); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 
548 U.S. 331 (2006); Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 
371 (1998).  
 60. Torres v. State, No. PCD-04-442, 2004 WL 3711623, at 1 (Okla. Crim. App. May 
13, 2004) (order granting stay of execution and remanding case for evidentiary hearing). 
 61. See generally Heather L. Finstuen, Note, From the World Court to Oklahoma 
Court: The Significance of Torres v. State for International Court of Justice Authority, 
Individual Rights, and the Availability of Remedy in Vienna Convention Disputes, 58 OKLA. 
L. REV. 255 (2005).  
 62. Gutierrez v. State, No. 53506, 2012 WL 4355518 (Nev. Sept. 19, 2012); see also 
Sandra Babcock, The Limits of International Law: Efforts to Enforce Rulings of the 
International Court of Justice in U.S. Death Penalty Cases, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 183 
(2012) (discussing the VCCR Article 36 case law). 
 63. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties . . . .”). 
 64. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is the 
point to which the particulars of crime and criminal are relevant: within the category of 
capital crimes, the death penalty must be reserved for ‘the worst of the worst.’”). 
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deserving of execution are put to death . . . .”65 Once this narrow class of 
the worst criminal is identified, adjudicative assessment of the two main 
principles of punishment utilized by the state to legitimize the death penalty 
are initiated. Since the reintroduction of the death penalty in Gregg v. 
Georgia66 in 1976, the penological interests for justifying the death penalty 
are most commonly found within the theories of retribution67 and 
deterrence.68 In the propositions for proportional retribution (which is 
classically formulated from the lex talionic69 “eye-for-an-eye”70 principle), 
it is claimed by retentionists that there exists a legitimate punishment 
interest to put to death the “worst of the worst” class of persons who 
commit homicide.71 In the application of deterrence, it is argued that there 
                                                                                                                 
 65. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319; see also Chelsea C. Sharon, The “Most Deserving” of 
Death: The Narrowing Requirement and the Proliferation of Aggravating Factors in Capital 
Sentencing Statutes, 46 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 223 (2011).  
 66. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).  
 67. See Andrew Oldenquist, Retribution and the Death Penalty, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 
335 (2004). But see LLOYD STEFFEN, EXECUTING JUSTICE: THE MORAL MEANING OF THE 
DEATH PENALTY (1998) (rebutting the retribution argument for the application of the death 
penalty).  
 68. See Michael L. Radelet & Ronald L. Akers, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: The 
Views of the Experts, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1996); Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital 
Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 751 (2005).  
 69. Immanuel Kant famously declared in his formulation of talionic justice, “[I]f he has 
committed murder, he must die. In this case, no possible substitute can satisfy justice. . . . 
This equality of punishments is therefore possible only if the judge passes the death sentence 
in accordance with the strict law of retribution.” Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of 
Morals, in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 131, 156 (Hans Reiss ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., 2d ed. 
1991).  
 70. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (3d ed. 2002); Erwin J. Urch, The Law Code of Hammurabi, 15 
A.B.A. J. 437, 438 (1929).  
 71. It is highly debatable whether the capital judicial process can consistently and fairly 
identify the “worst of the worst” criminal. The Supreme Court decision in Kansas v. Marsh, 
548 U.S. 163 (2006), considered the practical vicissitudes in the Kansas jury being presented 
with aggravating and mitigating circumstances which were evenly balanced. Id. at 165-66. 
The criminal could not be classified as the worst of the worst, but the court was allowed to 
impose a death sentence. Id. at 181. See generally Benjamin Barron, Equipoise, Collective 
Rights and the Future of the Death Penalty: Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006), 30 
HARV. J.L. & POL’Y 439 (2006) (reviewing Kansas v. Marsh); Elizabeth Brandenburg, Note, 
Kansas v. Marsh: A Thumb on the Scale of Death?, 58 MERCER L. REV 1447 (2007) (same). 
Due to the inherent persistence of arbitrary sentencing there is a practical impossibility of the 
capital judicial system maintaining a fair and consistent assessment of the “worst of the 
worst,” and this fanciful idea has been rejected by various sociologists, criminologists and 
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is a preventative phenomenon within the capital sanction and it can be 
proven to contribute to the reduction of serious crime.72 Retentionist states 
argue that if these two interests are reflected within the full comity review, 
the capital sanction through to an execution is a legitimate punishment.  
The comity interests promoted by the defendants and post-conviction 
prisoners include ensuring an adequate process for the choice of whether to 
allow the execution through the prisoner’s autonomous and informed 
decision renouncing all future appeals (known as “volunteering for 
execution”73), or for the prisoner to pursue any direct review, collateral 
attack or further habeas corpus appeals available to him or her. Most people 
sentenced to death are interested in using the appeals process to ensure that 
life remains. The right to continue life claims will include, inter alia, that 
the sentence was wrong as petitioner maintains his or her innocence,74 that 
the narrowing jurisprudence of the “worst of the worst” was misapplied,75 
that petitioner has mental health issues which should have reduced the 
moral culpability for the crime,76 and that the quality of the defense team 
was below the standard of effective representation.77 It is here that the 
comity principle to adequately review such claims has a direct relationship 
with protecting the right to life of the petitioner, as mechanisms are utilized 
to maintain life in the presence of an impending execution. However, even 
                                                                                                                 
human rights lawyers. For example, Jonathan Simon and Christina Spaulding have argued 
that the extent to which defendants are identified as “death eligible” from pre- to post-
Furman, is almost indistinguishable. Jonathan Simon & Christina Spaulding, Tokens of Our 
Esteem: Aggravating Factors in the Era of Deregulated Death Penalties, in THE KILLING 
STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE, 86, 87 (Austin Sarat ed., 
1999). 
 72. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.  
 73. See John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: “Volunteers,” Suicide and Competency, 
103 MICH. L. REV. 939 (2005); Anthony J. Casey, Maintaining the Integrity of Death: An 
Argument for Restricting a Defendant’s Right to Volunteer for Execution at Certain Stages 
in Capital Proceedings, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 75 (2002); Meredith M. Rountree, Volunteers for 
Execution: Directions for Further Research into Grief, Culpability and Legal Structures, 82 
UMKC L. REV. 295 (2014). 
 74. See Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573 (2004); Michael L. Radelet, The Role of the Innocence Argument in 
Contemporary Death Penalty Debates, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 199 (2008).  
 75. See supra note 71.  
 76. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1991-92 (2014); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 320-21 (2002); Ashley Sachiko Wong, Note, Aligning the Criminal Justice System with 
the Mental Health Profession in Response to Hall v. Florida, 94 OR. L. REV. 425 (2016). 
 77. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003); Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 678 (1984).  
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if the prisoner wants to stay alive, but it is deemed that there is now 
approaching a moment of closure in the litigation and the execution can 
proceed, both the state and the prisoner still have comity interests in 
ensuring that the punishment method meets constitutional standards and 
does not impose “needless suffering.”78 Indeed, this is the central focus of 
Parts III-VII below.  
It is evident by this short review that comity in the death penalty is a 
complex principle within the federal architecture. In reaction to the 
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 
1995, there was great political pressure on President Bill Clinton for these 
complex issues to be processed in an expedient manner and thus the 
greasing of the death penalty wheels was created through the adoption of 
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) in 1998.79 
The AEDPA limits both the procedural issues (for example, preventing 
successive petitions80) and substantive issues (for example, the assessment 
of the performance of counsel81 or the diagnosis of the mental health of the 
petitioner82), and so the legislation is designed to reduce the scope of the 
writ of habeas corpus. Consequently, this legislative provision is intended 
to streamline the review; however, a potential arises for the interests of 
comity to come into conflict with the doctrine of finality. 
B. Finality 
The AEDPA was designed to ensure that once comity is observed and 
completed by the state and federal courts, a different feature of the capital 
judicial process is then initiated—that of finality. In 1963, Paul Bator 
articulated a landmark taxonomy on the doctrine of finality,83 and his work 
now finds a privileged status within “legal process theory” scholarship.84 
                                                                                                                 
 78. The prohibition of punishment which is “‘sure or very likely to cause serious illness 
or needless suffering,’ and give rise to ‘sufficiently imminent dangers,’” was affirmed in 
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (2008) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 34-35 
(1993)).  
 79. See Kovarsky, supra note 18 (critiquing the AEDPA); Lee, supra note 18 (same).  
 80. See Deborah L. Stahlkopf, A Dark Day for Habeas Corpus: Successive Petitions 
Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1115 
(1998).  
 81. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1983); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534.  
 82. See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1986; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304. 
 83. Bator, supra note 17, at 452-53. See generally Kim, supra note 18 (cogently 
critiquing the doctrine of finality).  
 84. William Eskridge explains that legal process theory is “set forth in a purpose-based 
version of legal positivism.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., Nino’s Nightmare: Legal Process 
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Bator’s theory is based on the notion that the principle of comity cannot 
allow criminal proceedings to be unending as “[t]here comes a point where 
a procedural system which leaves matters perpetually open no longer 
reflects humane concern but merely anxiety and a desire for immobility.”85 
The creation of a legitimate criminal (and thus, capital) justice process is 
thus contingent upon a moment in time at which the state can say—the case 
is now closed. It is final in an expression of procedural termination.86 This 
is primarily an application of case management over the protection of 
constitutional rights because it is proposed that “[f]ew things have so 
plagued the administration of criminal justice, or contributed more to lower 
public confidence in the courts, than the interminable appeals, the retrials, 
and the lack of finality.”87 Even so, Bator still informed us that there is a 
“problem of finality” that needs to be resolved, “as it bears on the great task 
of creating rational institutional schemes for the administration of the 
criminal law.”88 Such rationality should also apply to the capital judicial 
system.  
                                                                                                                 
Theory as a Jurisprudence of Toggling Between Facts and Norms, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 865, 
865 (2013). Brad Snyder identifies that the components of legal process theory involve 
“‘reasoned elaboration’ from judges, ‘neutral principles’ from judicial decisions, use of 
‘passive virtues’ by the Supreme Court, and the understanding of institutional 
interrelationships among courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies.” Brad Snyder, 
Rejecting the Legal Process Theory Joker: Bill Nelson’s Scholarship on Judge Edward 
Weinfeld and Justice Byron White, 89 CHI-KENT. L. REV. 1065, 1066 (2014) (footnotes 
omitted); see also Steven Graines & Justin Wyatt, The Rehnquist Court, Legal Process 
Theory, and McClesky v. Kemp, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2000); Theodore W. Jones, Textualism 
and Legal Process Theory: Alternative Approaches to Statutory Interpretation, 26 J. LEGIS. 
45 (2000). 
 85. Bator, supra note 17, at 452-53. 
 86. The Supreme Court has noted, “While we have long recognized that States have an 
interest in securing the finality of their judgments, finality is not a stand-alone value that 
trumps a State's overriding interest in ensuring that justice is done in its courts and secured 
to its citizens.” Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 98 
(2009) (internal citations omitted). 
 87. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 405-06 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  
 88. Bator, supra note 17, at 446. As detailed below in this article, there are many 
examples within the capital judicial system to challenge Bator’s assumptions on the 
effectiveness and utility of finality. In the remarks given at the memorial service for Paul 
Bator at the University of Chicago Law School on March 4, 1989, Charles Fried commented 
on Bator’s Harvard Law Review article of 1963, stating: 
 We can almost feel Paul working to tie some very technical and intricate 
matter to the most basic stuff of our institutions as thoughtful, decent citizens. 
And there is the underlying faith that there are thoughtful, decent persons—
judges, students, lawyers—that they can understand and will respond. 
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The Supreme Court in Herrera v. Collins identified the “need for finality 
in capital cases,”89 and it is most clearly expressed through the execution of 
the inmate. However, “finality” in the death penalty is a difficult 
phenomenon to legitimately achieve. There is a beginning of finality, which 
occurs at the pronouncement of the death sentence when the trial judge sets 
the original date for the execution.90 The end of finality only occurs 
following an execution, or in the decision for a granting of a stay, or the 
finding of an exonerating circumstance and a parole board or governor 
granting clemency.91 What occurs in between the beginning and the end is 
the engagement, and potential friction or agonism, with comity interests. 
An interaction between comity and finality occurs, which can ferment the 
pressure of the need for the beginning to become the end.92 State interests in 
finality solidify when the appeals have been exhausted and the 
constitutionality of the method of the execution has been affirmed. After 
which, legitimate finality can be fulfilled in an execution. On the other 
hand, whilst an execution is a state finality-outcome interest, if the inmate 
files appeals, then he or she strives for an opposite finality-outcome in a 
decision that allows his or her life to continue. Therefore, the case becomes 
closed by the revocation of the death sentence, not its implementation. A 
finality outcome can thus be expressed in different ways by the different 
parties.93  
                                                                                                                 
 It may be because for a while that faith was shaken that he fell relatively 
silent. 
Charles Fried, Paul Bator, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 419, 420 (1989). 
 89. 506 U.S. 390, 418 (1993). 
 90. Or perhaps in some accused minds it occurs at the capital charge, as the realization 
of the possibility of being brought within the capital judicial system can initiate the adverse 
psychological effects of the death row phenomenon. See Jon Yorke, Inhuman Punishment 
and the Abolition of the Death Penalty in the Council of Europe, 16 EUR. PUB. L. 77 (2010).  
 91. Examples of the work of those exonerated fighting the death penalty can be found 
online at Witness to Innocence, the Equal Justice Initiative, and within the data on innocence 
collected by the Death Penalty Information Center. See WITNESS TO INNOCENCE, 
http://www.witnesstoinnocence.org/ (last visited May 12, 2017); THE EQUAL JUSTICE 
INITIATIVE, http://eji.org/death-penalty/innocence (last visited May 12, 2017); DEATH 
PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-
penalty (last visited May 12, 2017). 
 92. Lee Kovarsky has noted this tension as comity and finality are not necessarily 
“mutually reinforcing interests,” and in the “relationship between AEDPA’s exhaustion 
provision and its statute of limitations,” the friction is apparent. Kovarsky, supra note 18, at 
457.  
 93. See generally AUSTIN SARAT, MERCY ON TRIAL: WHAT IT MEANS TO STOP AN 
EXECUTION (2007). 
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Generally, finality interests in death penalty cases are prima facie more 
difficult to achieve than in non-capital criminal proceedings. A key finality 
interest in non-capital criminal proceedings is that it preserves the resources 
of the criminal justice system to enable it to effectively determine future 
cases. They are not confined to fiscal calculations but extend to the 
“intellectual, moral and political resources involved in the legal system.”94 
It is further claimed that the closure of the proceedings incentivizes defense 
counsel to provide effective assistance for the defendant(s) as preserved 
within the Sixth Amendment’s “assistance of counsel” clause.95 Also, it is 
maintained that the absoluteness of a decision contributes to the general and 
specific deterrent effect as a principle of penology—for example, found in 
the slogan, “life should mean life.”96 Otherwise, society will question and 
potentially lose confidence in the effectiveness of the sentencing system.97  
These normative interests in finality, however, are not systematically 
reflected in the death penalty. In fact, the capital judicial process struggles 
to implement these interests, and in many instances, it blatantly fails. This 
is because of the significant expense in funding the resources for sufficient 
defense teams for both the guilt/innocence phase and the mitigation phase 
of the trial, and then the proceeding post-conviction appeals through to 
clemency hearings.98 The American Bar Association’s Guidelines for the 
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty 
Cases99 provides a detailed framework for establishing capital 
representation from a multi-generational analysis of the client’s life history, 
through to effective trial (and appeals) representation, and the composition 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Bator, supra note 17, at 451.  
 95. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, (holding that ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims had to show two elements: (i) the counsel’s representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness; and, (ii) counsel’s performance prejudiced 
the defense so as to deny a fair trial).  
 96. See Jonathan Simon, How Should We Punish Murder?, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1241 
(2011) (discussing the appropriate punishment for murder).  
 97. See Sarah L. Cooper, Judicial Responses to Challenges to Firearms-Identification 
Evidence: A Need for New Judicial Perspectives on Finality, 31 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 457 
(2014) (critiquing finality interests); Kim, supra note 18 (same).  
 98. See Costs of the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www. 
deathpenaltyinfo.org/costs-death-penalty (last visited May 12, 2017) (assessing the growing 
costs of the death penalty within individual states). 
 99. Am. Bar Ass’n, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense 
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003); see also Am. Bar Ass’n, 
Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty 
Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677 (2008).  
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and role of the mitigation team.100 When considering the interests of 
finality, it is clear that the death penalty consistently fails to meet these 
performance thresholds, as the capricious body of cases detailing 
substandard legal representation demonstrates that ineffective assistance of 
counsel is commonplace.101 There is no reliable evidence that the capital 
sanction and executions provide a general (or specific) deterrent effect,102 
and executions are commonly botched, which violates the principle that 
finality in punishment must reflect only constitutional standards.103 The 
result is that the capital judicial process poses the greatest opportunity for 
finality to compromise justice and confidence in a procedurally fair 
outcome.104 
Finality interests are further complicated by the wider consultation on the 
death penalty. The abolitionist community has lobbied politicians, initiated 
litigation, and sought to ensure that the commercial world is reflective of 
constitutional standards and human rights values. A very successful 
campaign resulted in international focus on pharmaceutical companies’ 
contracts to manufacture and distribute substances for state prisons to use in 
executions.105 For a combination of reasons, including human rights 
arguments,106 the medical ethics of primum non nocere (Latin for, “first do 
                                                                                                                 
 100. For further details on the standards of representation see the American Bar 
Association’s Death Penalty Representation Project, which provides capital representation 
resources from both the federal and state jurisdictions. See Death Penalty Representation 
Project, AM. B. ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/death_penalty_rep 
resentation.html (last visited May 12, 2017). 
 101. See, e.g., Wiggins, 539 U.S. at. 510; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668.  
 102. ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE 
PERSPECTIVE 389-423 (5th ed. 2015).  
 103. See infra Part VII.  
 104. See Kovarsky, supra note 18, at 454.  
 105. The European Union was the first political region to adopt legislation banning the 
production and trade in execution technologies beginning in 2005 and it was strengthened in 
2010. See European Parliament Resolution on Implementation of Council Regulation, 
Concerning Trade in Certain Goods Which Could be Used for Capital Punishment, Torture 
or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (EC) No. 1236/2005 of 17 
June 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 236); see AMNESTY INT’L, FROM WORDS TO DEEDS: MAKING THE 
EU BAN ON THE TRADE IN ‘TOOLS OF TORTURE’ A REALITY (2010), https://www.amnesty.org/ 
en/documents/eur01/004/2010/en/ (exampling the human rights arguments on the violations 
occurring from trade in execution technologies); Christian Behrmann & Jon Yorke, The 
European Union and Abolition of the Death Penalty, 4 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE 
COMPANION 1 (2013), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilronline/39/ (reviewing the 
European Union’s policies on the abolition of the death penalty). 
 106. See generally SANGMIN BAE, WHEN THE STATE NO LONGER KILLS: INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS AND ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2007); HOOD & HOYLE, 
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no harm”107), and the growing sense of “corporate social responsibility,”108 
American pharmaceutical companies have revoked their licenses with the 
Food and Drug Administration (hereinafter “FDA”) to manufacture sodium 
thiopental for end-use as an anesthetic in the execution protocol. 
Consequently, retentionist states’ stocks of anesthetics for executions began 
to deplete, and run out,109 and so to continue to administer the death penalty 
they have selected other drugs, such as pentobarbital110 and midazolam.111 
This has become necessary because of the Supreme Court’s awkward 
reasoning in Baze v. Rees that as the death penalty is constitutional “there 
must be a constitutional means to administer it.”112 So the states now look 
to pharmacological science to give life to the capital judicial system. 
Oklahoma positions itself at the forefront of this incongruous endeavor. 
  
                                                                                                                 
supra note 102; SCHABAS, supra note 70; AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY: INTERNATIONAL 
INITIATIVES AND IMPLICATIONS (Jon Yorke ed., 2008) [hereinafter AGAINST THE DEATH 
PENALTY].  
 107. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BREACH OF TRUST: PHYSICIAN 
PARTICIPATION IN EXECUTIONS IN THE U.S. (1994); William J. Curran & Ward Casscells, The 
Ethics of Medical Participation in Capital Punishment by Intravenous Drug Injection, 302 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 226 (1980); Neil Farber et al., Physicians’ Attitudes About Involvement in 
Lethal Injection for Capital Punishment, 160 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2912 (2000); Lisa 
R. Hasday, The Hippocratic Oath as Literary Text: A Dialogue between Law and Medicine, 
2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 299 (2002) (reviewing the legal implications of the 
Hippocratic Oath); Paul Litton, Physician Participation in Executions, the Morality of 
Capital Punishment, and the Practical Implications of Their Relationship, 41 J.L. MED. 
ETHICS 333 (2013).  
 108. See Evi Girling, Looking Death in the Face: The Benetton Death Penalty 
Campaign, 6 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 271 (2004); Clare Algar, Big Pharma May Help End the 
Death Penalty, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 22, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/115284/big-
pharma-may-end-death-penalty; Business and Human Rights, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www. 
amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/business-and-human-rights (last visited May 12, 2017) 
(generally outlining the commercial sector and human rights). 
 109. By 2009, state prisons had run out of sodium thiopental for use as an anesthetic in 
executions. See Brief for the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics at Fordham University 
School of Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 22, Glossip v. Gross 135 S. Ct. 
2726 (2015) (No. 14-7955), 2015 WL 1247189.  
 110. The pharmacological substance pentobarbital and its use in Kentucky’s execution 
protocol was considered in the litigation in Baze, 553 U.S. at 56-57. 
 111. See Brief of Sixteen Professors of Pharmacology as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party at 9, Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (No. 14-7955), 2015 WL 
1247193.  
 112. Baze, 553 U.S. at 47.  
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III. Determining Scientific Evidence in the Courtroom 
The adjudication on the science for executions has become a key issue 
for balancing comity and finality interests. A central issue for determination 
is the management of pain in punishment under the Eighth Amendment,113 
and it is of crucial importance that a transparent assessment of the 
pharmacology used in executions is available to discern the highest 
“epistemological quality of scientific research results.”114 In 1977, 
Oklahoma began its experiment with lethal injection as a method of 
execution and it adopted policies to attempt to ensure that appropriate drugs 
were used in executions.115 The inventor of lethal injection, Dr. Jay 
Chapman, cautiously advised members of Oklahoma’s legislature that he 
was “an expert in dead bodies but not an expert in getting them that 
way.”116 At the dawn of the state’s use of lethal injection, the journalist, Jim 
Killackey, noted the early observations on the need to constantly assess the 
pharmacology, as “[o]fficials feel that if and when they have to use the 
injection law, new and better ways may be available.”117  
                                                                                                                 
 113. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 114. Hussey Freeland, supra note 8. Carl Wenning stated that epistemology is the 
philosophical enquiry into “ways of knowing and how we know,” and “[s]cience is a way of 
knowing that requires a strong philosophical underpinning.” See Carl J. Wenning, Scientific 
Epistemology: How Scientists Know What They Know, ILL. STATE UNIV. J. OF PHYSICS 
TEACHER EDUC. ONLINE, Autumn 2009, at 3. 
 115. The possibility of lethal injection as a means of execution was considered by the 
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment in 1949-53. ROYAL COMM. ON CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT, 1949-1953 REPORT, 1953, Cmd. 8932, at 257-61 (UK). In 1977, Dr. Jay 
Chapman identified what he thought were appropriate pharmacological substances for use in 
lethal injection as a new method of judicial execution in Oklahoma. See Denno, supra note 
7, at 1340. Dr. Chapman has now recognized the problems inherent within the U.S. capital 
judicial system, and in an interview, he claimed, “I had no idea, I was so naïve” about the 
(in)effectiveness of the use of pharmacology in executions. Ed Pilkington, It’s Problematic: 
Inventor of US Lethal Injection Reveals Death Penalty Doubts, GUARDIAN (Apr. 29, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/29/supreme-court-lethal-injection-inventor-
death-penalty-doubts. In 1982, Texas was the first state to conduct a lethal injection and the 
prisoner executed was Charles Brooks. This marked the beginning of the implementation of 
this pharmacological process in the U.S. capital judicial system. Steve Carrell, Execution 
Controversy Faces Physician, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 21, 1983, at 37, cited in Deborah W. 
Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 79 (2007). For an excellent history of lethal injection, see generally 
Denno, supra note 9.  
 116. Email from A. Jay Chapman, Forensic Pathologist, Santa Rosa, Cal., to Professor 
Deborah Denno (Jan. 18, 2006) (on file with Denno), cited in Denno, supra note 7, at 1340.  
 117. Jim Killackey, Officials Draw a Grim Execution Scene, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 
12, 1979, at 1, cited in Denno, supra note 7, at 1340; see Brief for The Louis Stein Center 
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The original three drugs used in Oklahoma’s lethal injection executions 
were sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride.118 
Over the past forty years there have been significant advances in 
pharmacological science and it is necessary that any change in the 
pharmacology should be adequately analyzed and tested to ensure that 
constitutional executions are maintained. A review is required of the 
established scientific methodologies and data results for determining the 
reliability of the State’s propositions, and to highlight any findings 
concerning new drug limitations. As we will see, the scrutiny of the new 
pharmacology reached the state and federal courts, but the extent to which a 
transparent evaluation is achieved will depend upon the judiciary adopting 
sound investigative methodologies.  
Before we engage with Oklahoma’s assessment of the new 
pharmacology in the incorporation of midazolam to replace sodium 
thiopental in the protocol, it is useful to consider the utility of the scientific 
methodologies of atomism and holism, and the adjudicative guidelines for 
the courts via the Federal Rules of Evidence (hereinafter “FRE”). The 
judge’s understanding of both scientific methodology and the legislative 
directions is fundamentally important for uncovering sound pharmacology 
and, in this instance, whether midazolam is an appropriate drug for lethal 
injection. 
A. The Atomistic and Holistic Review of Scientific Evidence 
When considering scientific evidence, the judge (as legal fact finder) is 
confronted with the need to understand the variables in the scientific 
methodology and data. Jennifer Mnookin reasons that the process becomes 
“one of interpretive convention, intuition and common sense,” which is left 
fundamentally to the court’s discretion, “framed primarily by the judges’ 
inchoate and instinctive sense of how best to proceed.”119 The judge 
                                                                                                                 
for Law and Ethics, supra note 109, at 12-18 (reviewing the early history of lethal injection 
in Oklahoma).  
 118. See id.  
 119. Mnookin, supra note 20, at 1528. In 2009, the National Research Council of 
the National Academies stated, 
Scientists continually observe, test, and modify the body of knowledge. Rather 
than claiming absolute truth, science approaches truth either through 
breakthrough discoveries or incrementally, by testing theories repeatedly. . . . 
Typically, experiments or observations must be conducted over a broad range 
of conditions before the roles of specific factors, patterns, or variables can be 
understood. 
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initiates two important interpretive approaches in reviewing the science: 
these are classified through atomistic or holistic methodologies. An 
atomistic framing of the scientific testimony occurs when judges consider 
the “prejudice and probative value of [the evidence] taken by itself,” and a 
holistic weighing occurs when judges “evaluate both prejudice and 
probative value within a broader context . . . taking into consideration the 
other evidence adduced in the case.”120  
To approach the “truth” of a scientific claim there is often an interpretive 
frisson121 between the atomistic and holistic approaches. In an example of 
atomism, when the State applies a scientific perspective, it may only 
represent doing science in a confined box. The petitioner, however, may 
then present an alternative viewpoint, but again it may only represent 
science in a certain context. Hence, both the State and the petitioner have 
provided confined viewpoints, which in many ways may appear opposed to 
one another. An atomistic interpretation occurs when a singular perspective 
of the science is privileged, relied upon, and then used to inform a legal 
judgment. It is viewed in isolation and the alternative perspective on the 
science is rejected without any clear methodology and extraction of data 
interpretation explaining why. If the methodology and data variables are 
reviewed together, the adjudicative assessment may provide a holistic 
perspective placing the various scientific opinions on a wider interpretive 
horizon. The scientific nuances can produce more than two viewpoints and 
can reveal a need for a sensitive balancing of issues using all reasonably 
applicable methodology and data variables. It may be revealed in the 
litigation that one perspective is more accurate than another or that there is 
a resultant methodological flaw or data lacuna, which demonstrates that 
further testing is required.  
                                                                                                                 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 112 (2009).  
 120. Mnookin, supra 20, at 1526. (Jennifer Mnookin identified that when a judge weighs 
the probative value of expert submissions, she can view each proposition in isolation in an 
“atomistic” investigation, but there is a danger that such an approach can be overly 
subjective, and have an appearance of bias to the detriment of heterogeneous outcomes. Id. 
at 1563-64. In utilizing this approach, there is an enhanced opportunity for the privileging of 
one scientific methodology and/or data over another. Alternatively, each aspect of scientific 
methodology and data can be placed within a “holistic” review, in a value-neutral analysis, 
and then all evidence can be viewed through the solidity of an encompassing consideration. 
In a holistic approach to science there is a greater opportunity for identifying the necessity 
for further testing to understand data variables. See id.) 
 121. See Sarah L. Cooper, The Collision of Law and Science: American Court Responses 
to Developments in Forensic Science, 33 PACE L. REV. 234, 238-39, 301 (2013).  
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As the judge may select the methodology which he or she deems 
appropriate, a potential arises for the adjudicative process to lead to what 
Deborah Hussey Freeland identifies as scientific “over-claiming.”122 The 
danger is that there can be an adjudicative misrepresentation of scientific 
principles by the judge failing to apply the nuances of reasoning and error 
rates within methodologies and data findings. The law can achieve this by 
framing the science within seemingly compact homogenous (legal) proof-
of-concept. For example, if the capital judicial system seeks to promote the 
Herrera v. Collins standard of the “need for finality in capital cases,”123 
there is a danger that the rendering of an execution in service to the interests 
of finality can be facilitated through an adoption of atomism, over holism, 
in science. An atomistic approach can more readily facilitate finality, as 
science can be (incorrectly) perceived to provide mechanisms for 
expediency in sentencing. The danger is that a judicial reductio ad 
absurdum of science will place a veneer of legitimacy over prima facie, 
irredeemable, barbaric consequences within executions. It is here that the 
role of the judge as “scientific gatekeeper” becomes fundamentally 
important for the realization of accurate science in maintaining 
constitutionally permissible punishment. 
B. The Role of the Judge as Scientific “Gatekeeper” 
To help manage the parameters of judicial discretion in the review of 
science in the courtroom, guidelines have been created which are to be 
applied to the presented assessment methodology and data findings. The 
primary legislative provision is Rule 702 of the FRE, as amended in 2000, 
which establishes that a witness who is qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may supply expert 
analysis in the form of a written submission and/or oral testimony, if (a) the 
expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) 
the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the 
product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably 
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.124  
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc.,125 the Supreme Court 
held that under the FRE, the trial judge “must ensure that any and all 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Hussey Freeland, supra note 8, at 538.  
 123. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993). 
 124. FED. R. OF EVID. 702.  
 125. 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). 
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scientific testimony or evidence is not only relevant, but reliable,”126 and 
the “adjective ‘scientific’ implies a grounding in the methods and 
procedures of science.”127 The Court explained that “scientific knowledge” 
means more than “subjective belief or unsupported speculation,”128 and so 
it is expected that supportable scientific methodology and data is to be 
identified as probative. The Supreme Court subsequently solidified this 
adjudicative function by providing procedural protection for the judge’s 
decisions. For example, in General Electrical Co. v. Joiner it was held that 
the “judge’s determinations regarding the admissibility of expert testimony 
were to be reviewed only for abuse of discretion.”129 This review standard 
for the “scientific expert” was then extended to all experts in Khumo Tire 
Co. v. Carmichael.130 Cassandra Welch argues that the general application 
of the Daubert trilogy (Daubert, Joiner, and Khumo) will be an exercise of 
“deferential review” in which the legal fact finder will be provided 
extensive latitude.131 This corpus of cases was designed to provide courts a 
                                                                                                                 
 126. Id. at 589.  
 127. Id. at 590.  
 128. Id. In applying Rule 702, Daubert overruled Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 
(D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye created the standard of review in which a judges’ discretion was 
significantly curtailed by the weight of the scientific evidence, requiring judges determining 
the admissibility of scientific evidence to be sufficiently convinced that the testimony had 
“gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” Id. at 1014. Some 
scholars have argued that an unreasonably high evidentiary burden was created which 
unjustifiably prevented decision-makers from considering new scientific data or 
methodologies which could aid the decision making process. Concerning the restrictive 
perspective, Judge Harvey Brown has argued:  
The Frye test was criticized because the newness of a scientific theory does not 
necessarily reflect its unreliability, “nose counting” of the scientific community 
could be difficult and unhelpful, and the standard delays the admissibility of 
new evidence simply because the scientific community has not had adequate 
time to accept the new theory. 
Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses, 36 HOUSTON L. REV. 743, 779 (1999). See 
generally Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of 
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471 (2005). 
 129. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (establishing that “abuse of 
discretion is the proper standard by which to review a district court’s decision to admit or 
exclude scientific evidence”).  
 130. 527 U.S. 137, 138 (1999) (establishing the review standard for all experts presenting 
evidence to the courts).  
 131. Cassandra H. Welch, Note, Flexible Standards, Deferential Review: Daubert’s 
Legacy of Confusion, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1085, 1089-90 (2006).  
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case management function with a significant degree of deference,132 which 
clearly raises the bar for any litigant claiming that the court was incorrect 
on the science. For the purpose of this article, any claims that the judge 
misapplied the pharmacological science to maintain an execution in an 
example of abuse of judicial discretion will be a high hurdle to get over.133 
The Advisory Committee to the Amendments of the FRE (2000) 
provided additional observations on Rule 702.134 The Advisory Committee 
drew from case law to highlight evidentiary principles for identifying 
relevant and sufficiently reliable expert testimony, which included whether 
experts are proposing written and/or oral evidence about findings emerging 
naturally out of their research and whether such matters were conducted 
independent of the litigation. The court should identify if the expert has 
formulated his or her opinions specifically for the purposes of the judicial 
proceedings135 or has provided any unjustifiable extrapolation from 
scientific opinion,136 and whether the expert has adequately accounted for 
obvious alternative explanations.137 The Advisory Committee also 
identified that the expert should provide the same caution and depth of 
analysis as he or she would to his or her regular professional work outside 
consulting contracts, and the field of expertise should be known to reach 
reliable results for the type of opinion the expert will give.138 The Daubert 
                                                                                                                 
 132. David L. Faigman, The Daubert Revolution and the Birth of Modernity: Managing 
Scientific Evidence in the Age of Science, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 893, 920-21 (2013); see 
David E. Bernstein, The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert Revolution, 89 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27, 28, 66 (2013) (arguing that the additional provisions to the 
adjudicative role that a judge conducts means that “Rule 702 not only codifies revolutionary 
changes in the substantive law, but also places substantial new demands on judges by 
requiring a far more managerial role for judges than they are used to assuming in the 
American adversarial system”).  
 133. Megan J. Ryan, Finality and Rehabilitation, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 121, 121 
(2014) (describing the doctrine of finality as creating a “high hurdle for individuals to 
overcome”). 
 134. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments. 
 135. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).  
 136. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146 (stating that in some cases a trial court “may conclude that 
there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered”). 
 137. The Advisory Committee referred to Claar v. Burlington Northern Railroad, 29 
F.3d 499, 500 (9th Cir. 1994), which included testimony where the expert failed to consider 
other obvious causes for the plaintiff's condition and Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 
129, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1996), where the possibility of some non-eliminated causes presents a 
question of weight, so long as the most obvious causes have been considered and reasonably 
ruled out by the expert. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments. 
 138. The 2009 Report of the National Research Council engaged with the Daubert 
interpretation of Rule 702 and observed that the Supreme Court provided guidance for the 
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decision affirmed that in applying these principles to determine the 
admissibility of scientific evidence, the adversarial system would provide 
“[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and 
careful instruction on the burden of proof” for “attacking shaky but 
admissible evidence.”139 The judge utilizes this judicial guidance because 
Rule 702 is a “flexible one,”140 but it is not “a ‘free-for-all’ in which 
befuddled juries [or judges] are confounded by absurd and irrational 
pseudoscientific assertions.”141  
The challenge for the State was to adequately demonstrate that the 
execution protocol was not informed by absurd and irrational 
pseudoscientific assertions and that the pharmacology used by the 
Oklahoma Department of Corrections rendered a constitutionally 
permissible punishment. To determine this, the District Court for the 
Western District of Oklahoma needed to apply the abovementioned 
scientific methodology and FRE and Daubert standards to the assessment 
of Oklahoma’s execution protocol. The court focused particularly on the 
State’s (seemingly unusual) claims that midazolam can render anesthetic 
properties, whereas the pharmaceutical industry recognizes that the drug is 
in the benzodiazepine class commonly used as a sedative and for treating 
different manifestations of anxiety.142 A significant fact for the proceedings 
                                                                                                                 
trial judge to consider: (a) whether the scientific theory or mechanism had been tested; (b) 
whether the expert’s propositions had been subject to peer review; (c) any error rate of the 
scientific technique; (d) any procedural standards controlling the mechanism’s operation; 
and, (e) the technique’s acceptance within the scientific community. See NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., supra note 119, at 91.  
 139. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (citation omitted).  
 140. Id. at 594.  
 141. Id. at 595-96. Bernstein argues that there is a need to “exclude expert testimony 
when experts cannot point to objective support for their conclusions, and instead intend to 
ask the trier of fact to trust their unconfirmed judgment. And that is precisely what Rule 702 
accomplishes.” Bernstein, supra note 132, at 69-70. Hussey Freeland states that scientific 
researchers should meet a minimum threshold of scientific professional norms to formulate 
what she terms the “epistemological quality” of the scientific research through careful 
application of appropriate scientific methodologies. Hussey Freeland, supra note 8, at 292. 
The flexibility of the interpretive approach allows the court to decide on how best to 
evaluate scientific evidence. In practice, however, the Honorable William Giacomo has 
argued that “Rule 702[] is not a foolproof or error-free standard.” William J. Giacomo, 
Scientific Proof: The Court’s Role as Gatekeeper for Admitting Scientific Expert Testimony, 
N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., June 2014, at 23, 25.  
 142. See Drug Fact Sheet: Benzodiazepines, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., https://www. 
dea.gov/druginfo/drug_data_sheets/Benzodiazepines.pdf (last visited May 12, 2017). 
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was that use of midazolam to act as an anesthetic in the death penalty had 
not been previously investigated through pharmacological trials. 
IV. The District Court’s Evidentiary Hearing in Warner v. Gross 
The evidentiary hearing of the district court in Warner v. Gross143 
provided a potential fertile stage for determining the science and the legal 
boundaries of Oklahoma’s execution protocol.144 In an attempt to promote 
legitimate state comity and finality interests to attain a constitutional 
execution, Oklahoma revised its execution protocol with the (then) most 
recent amended version being on June 30, 2015.145 There are four chemical 
charts (Charts A-D), which the Director of the Department of Corrections 
can select from for designating the specific drugs to be administered.146 
Chart D was chosen for the executions of Charles Warner and Richard 
Glossip, which set out the three-drug protocol of midazolam, vecuronium 
bromide, and potassium chloride.147  
In Chart D, the State’s intended use of midazolam is as an anesthetic to 
induce and maintain a surgical plane of unconsciousness.148 Following the 
initial injection, it allows the administration of vecuronium bromide to 
cause paralysis149 and then the noxious stimuli of potassium chloride to 
                                                                                                                 
 143. Warner, No. CIV 14-0665-F, 2014 WL 7671680 (W.D. Okla., Dec. 22, 2014).  
 144. Okla. Dep’t of Corrections, supra note 6.  
 145. Id.  
 146. Attachment D to Okla. Dep’t of Corrections, supra note 6, at 34 [hereinafter 
Attachment D] (follow hyperlink “Attachment D” to access charts). Chart A establishes a 
one-drug protocol with pentobarbital; Chart B establishes a one-drug protocol with sodium 
pentothal; Chart C is reserved; and Chart D establishes a three-drug protocol with the use of 
midazolam, vecuronium bromide, and potassium chloride. Id. at 2-4. Paragraph D “Choice 
of Chemicals,” states, “The director shall have sole discretion as to which chemicals shall be 
used for the scheduled execution. This decision shall be provided to the offender in writing 
ten (10) calendar days prior to the scheduled execution date.” Id. at 3. 
 147. See Attachment D, supra note 146, at 3. The section on midazolam states: “Syringes 
1A and 2A shall each have a dose of 250 milligrams [of] midazolam for a total dose of 500 
milligrams. Each syringe containing midazolam shall have a green label which contains the 
name of each chemical, the chemical amounts and the designated syringe number.” Id. 
 148. As will be reviewed in detail below, the State’s use of midazolam as an anesthetic in 
the execution protocol was significantly questioned and the leading pharmacological study 
on the drug identifies that it has insufficient analgesic properties. See infra Part VI; see also 
Reves et al., supra note 23, at 318.  
 149. See Vecuronium Bromide, DAILYMED, https://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/ 
drugInfo.cfm?setid=d3b851af-f8e9-4375-bbbe-7132e66ee0d0 (last updated July 21, 2011). 
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trigger a cardiac arrest to render the death of the prisoner.150 This process is 
designed by the State to attempt to inflict the minimal, if not eradicated, 
sensation of pain in the execution. On April 29, 2014, Clayton Lockett was 
the first Oklahoma inmate to be executed using the new protocol, but there 
were problems with the administration and the functioning of midazolam.151 
The execution occurred following numerous failed attempts to establish the 
IV line.152 After the suspension of the execution and then the surgical 
insertion of the needle into Lockett’s groin, he demonstrated consciousness 
by verbally complaining about the noxious effects of the drugs, and he 
physically struggled on the gurney before dying.153 The traumatic events of 
the execution were reported globally.154  
Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin issued Executive Order 2014-11 to 
appoint Mr. Michael Thompson, the Department of Public Safety 
Commissioner, to conduct an independent review of the events surrounding 
Lockett’s execution.155 On September 16, 2014, the “Executive 
Summary”156 was published, adopting recommendations for improving 
Oklahoma’s execution protocol.157 The Commissioner’s findings focused 
                                                                                                                 
 150. See Potassium Chloride, DAILYMED, https://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/drug 
Info.cfm?setid=333d672c-44bf-4544-bf8c-f6f72f3dfefe (last updated Aug. 31, 2006). 
 151. Erik Eckholm, One Execution Botched, Oklahoma Delays the Next, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/04/Oklahoma/361414/.  
 152. Id.  
 153. Id.  
 154. See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Stern, The Cruel and Unusual Execution of Clayton Lockett, 
ATLANTIC, June 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/06/execution-
clayton-lockett/392069/; Markus Feldenkirchen, Botched Execution: The Death that Could 
Kill Lethal Injection, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.spiegel.de/ 
international/world/execution-of-clayton-lockett-and-the-flaws-of-lethal-injection-a-9923 
59.html; Katie Fretland, Scene at Botched Oklahoma Execution of Clayton Lockett Was “a 
Bloody Mess,” GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/ 
13/botched-oklahoma-execution-clayton-lockett-bloody-mess; Josh Sanburn, 25 Secret 
Minutes Inside Oklahoma’s Execution Chamber, TIME (May 1, 2014), http://time.com/827 
87/oklahoma-botched-execution-clayton-lockett-lethal-injection-problems/; Paige Williams, 
Witness to a Botched Execution, NEW YORKER, (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/ 
news/news-desk/witnesses-to-a-botched-execution.  
 155. See OKLA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, THE EXECUTION OF 
CLAYTON D. LOCKETT: CASE NUMBER 14-0189SI 2 [hereinafter EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF 
EXECUTION OF CLAYTON LOCKETT]. This document is available online through the Death 
Penalty Information Center at http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/LockettInvestigation 
Report.pdf. 
 156. Id.  
 157. Governor Fallin’s Executive Order 2014-11 stated that the DPS review must 
include: 
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on rectifying the identified difficulties, including procedures for locating 
appropriate veins for IV insertion, the maintenance of execution equipment, 
and the training of the execution teams (including the Restraint Team and 
the IV Team).158 The three substances identified by the Oklahoma statute in 
Chart D were left unchanged following the acceptance of the 
pharmacological composition and the State’s claimed biological effects on 
those injected, as the Executive Summary stated:  
This investigation could not make a determination as to the 
effectiveness of the drugs at the specified concentration and 
volume. They were independently tested and found to be the 
appropriate potency as described. The IV failure complicated the 
ability to determine the effectiveness of the drugs.159 
This review was insufficient to determine the appropriateness of the 
execution drugs. Therefore, the evidentiary questions before the district 
court in Warner centered on deconstructing the pharmacology of 
midazolam and the rationale for Oklahoma adopting this substance to 
render an anesthetic state.160 Following the inadequate pharmacological 
assessment in the Executive Summary, it was revealed three fundamental 
components of the drug were still to be analyzed: (a) whether midazolam 
has a ceiling effect; (b) the extent to which the drug renders an analgesic 
effect; and (c) whether those injected with the drug will experience 
paradoxical reactions. 
A. Does Midazolam Have a Ceiling Effect?  
In the district court’s evidentiary hearing, Judge Friot weighed the expert 
testimony within the Daubert “gatekeeper” function.161 He identified that 
                                                                                                                 
[F]irst, an inquiry into the cause of death . . . by a forensic pathologist. Second, 
an inquiry into whether the Oklahoma Department of Corrections correctly 
followed the agency’s current protocol for executions. Lastly . . . any 
recommendations to improve the execution protocol used by the Oklahoma 
Department of Corrections. 
Okla. Exec. Dep’t, Executive Order No. 2014-11 (Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.sos.ok.gov/ 
documents/executive/942.pdf.  
 158. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF EXECUTION OF CLAYTON LOCKETT, supra note 155, at 26; 
see OKLA. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 6, at 8-10, 20, 22, 26.  
 159. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF EXECUTION OF CLAYTON LOCKETT, supra note 155, at 24.  
 160. See infra Section IV.A.1. 
 161. Court’s Ruling on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 36-40, Warner v. 
Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F (W.D. Okla. Dec 22, 2014), 2014 WL 10741415 [hereinafter 
Court’s Preliminary Injunction Ruling]. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
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appropriate submissions would be a “product of application of that 
expertise” and that an expert should use “recognized and supportable 
methodologies” with recourse to “adequate data which is rationally tied” to 
the pharmacology of midazolam.162 Judge Friot heard evidence from the 
State’s expert, Dr. Roswell Evans,163 and the petitioners’ experts, Dr. David 
Lubarsky164 and Dr. Larry Sasich.165 Mr. John Hadden of the Oklahoma 
Attorney General’s Office questioned Dr. Evans, who stated in oral 
testimony that midazolam is “primarily used as a drug to induce anesthesia, 
to actually facilitate minor procedures and decrease[] apprehension, [and] 
also [to] decrease[] memory of the event.”166 While the inducing of an 
unconscious state may occur in minor procedures, Dr. Lubarsky provided a 
nuanced articulation of the pharmacological properties in his report for the 
district court167 and stated that the FDA had not approved midazolam for 
invasive procedures (such as for an execution) because it is “not sufficient 
to produce a surgical plane of anesthesia in human beings.”168 Dr. Sasich 
                                                                                                                 
Circuit, the circuit that Judge Friot is under, affirmed in Goebel that this interpretive function 
“requires the judge to assess the reasoning and methodology underlying the expert’s opinion, 
and determine whether it is scientifically valid and applicable to a particular set of facts.” 
Goebel v. Denver and Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 1083, 1087 (2000). 
 162. Court’s Ruling Preliminary Injunction at 38, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F 
(W.D. Okla. Dec 22, 2014), 2014 WL 10741415. Judge Friot held the Daubert assessment of 
reliability is a 
determination of whether the conclusions to be expressed by an expert 
possessed of the necessary qualifications in the relevant field are the product of 
application of that expertise using recognized and supportable methodologies 
on the basis of adequate data which is rationally tied to the opinions which 
purport to be based on that data. 
Id. 
 163. Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 630, Warner 
v. Gross, No. CIV-14-665F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014). 
 164. Id. at 102.  
 165. Id. at 333-35.  
 166. Id. at 631.  
 167. Expert Report of David A. Lubarsky at 2, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV-14-665F (W.D. 
Okla. Dec. 22, 2014) (“Midazolam is known under the trade name Versed. It is the shortest 
acting benzodiazepine on the market. Benzodiazepines are a class of drugs primarily used 
for treating anxiety”). He affirmed this in oral testimony. Transcript of Preliminary 
Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 105, 114, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV-14-665F 
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014). 
 168. Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 107, Warner 
v. Gross, No. CIV-14-665F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014). 
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corroborated this alternative scientific viewpoint in his report to the court 
and in oral testimony.169  
To investigate the contested issues further, the experts considered 
whether if midazolam was not an anesthetic in the normal dose, an 
exponential dose of 500mg (which is over 100 times the normal therapeutic 
dose used in surgical procedures170) could induce an anesthetic effect. In 
language approaching a value judgment amounting to certainty in science, 
Dr. Evans stated that it “will render the person unconscious and insensate 
during the remainder of the [execution] procedure,”171 and “the proper 
administration of 500 milligrams of midazolam . . . make[s] it a virtual 
certainty that any individual will be at a sufficient level of unconsciousness 
to resist the noxious stimuli which could occur.”172 Dr. Evans made the 
finite claim that there was “no ceiling effect at that level”173 in the 
execution procedure, and that “as you increase the dose of midazolam, it’s a 
linear effect, so you’re going to continue to get an impact from higher doses 
of the drug.”174 Drs. Lubarsky175 and Sasich176 disagreed and maintained 
that there was an effective dose limit to midazolam and the data supported 
this proposition.177 In cross-examination, Dr. Evans provided a modified 
response to his previous definitive statement, stating that it “[d]epends on 
what [Drs. Lubarsky and Sasich are] referring to. If they’re talking about a 
spinal cord, I would tend to say, yes, that’s possible.”178 However, Dr. 
                                                                                                                 
 169. Report of Larry D. Sasich, at 3, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV-14-665F (W.D. Okla. 
Dec. 22, 2014); Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 345, 
Warner v. Gross, No. CIV-14-665F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014).  
 170. This massively elevated dose was affirmed during the evidentiary hearing when Mr. 
John Hadden of the Attorney General’s Office, directly examined the State expert on the 
issue, and Dr. Evans affirmed, “This dose is at least 100 times the normal therapeutic dose.” 
Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 635, Warner v. 
Gross, (No. CIV-14-665F), 2014 WL 7671680. Depending upon the physiological variables 
of the person being executed, the dose will range from 1.5 milligrams to 5 milligrams per 
kilogram of weight. Id. at 631-39. 
 171. Id. at 635.  
 172. Id. at 648.  
 173. Id. at 636.  
 174. Id. at 663.  
 175. Dr. Lubarsky provided a nuanced explanation and stated the specific criteria and 
application of midazolam “[d]oes not block pain impulses coming from different parts of the 
body. Meaning things like surgical incision, manipulation of the bowel, injection of caustic 
substances. Those would not be blocked.” Id. at 107.  
 176. Id. at 342.  
 177. Id. at 107, 342.  
 178. Id. at 664.  
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Lubarsky did not see the relevance of the isolation of the effect to the spinal 
cord or on the brain, as midazolam “[d]oes not block pain impulses coming 
from different parts of the body,” and so “[w]hat you’re attempting to do 
with an execution is provide a surgical plane of anesthesia. Which . . . you 
cannot do with midazolam no matter how much you give.”179 
On the issue of midazolam’s anesthetic properties, Judge Friot observed, 
“[a]s described by Dr. Sasich and Dr. Lubarsky, midazolam has a ceiling 
effect which prevents an increase in dosage from having a corresponding 
incremental effect on anesthetic depth.”180 Dr. Evans’s testimony, however, 
was recognized as probative for the judicial reasoning, as the judge claimed 
he “testified persuasively, in substance, that whatever the ceiling effect of 
midazolam may be with respect to anesthesia,” it is confined to the “spinal 
cord level.”181 Even though Drs. Lubarsky and Sasich testified that the 
ceiling effect was not anatomically confined,182 the district court privileged 
the uncorroborated testimony of Dr. Evans to make this legal decision. The 
court appeared to sideline the alternative science without providing any 
sound methodological reasons why.183 Judge Friot maintained that the issue 
of the ceiling effect in the spinal cord was “unknown” but then in seeming 
inconsistency stated that “[t]he proper administration of midazolam . . . 
would make it a virtual certainty that any individual will be at a sufficient 
level of unconsciousness to resist the noxious stimuli.”184 It is difficult to 
understand as a principle of science that, on one hand, the identification of 
the ceiling effect is unknown, and on the other hand, a sufficient level of the 
drug can be identified. 
                                                                                                                 
 179. Id. at 107, 125.  
 180. Court’s Ruling Preliminary Injunction at 43, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F 
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014), 2014 WL 10741415. 
 181. Id.  
 182. Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 345, Warner 
v. Gross, No. CIV-14-665F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014).  
 183. Court’s Ruling Preliminary Injunction at 43, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F 
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014), 2014 WL 10741415. Judge Friot proceeded to state in absolute 
terms: 
[T]here is no ceiling effect with respect to the ability of a 500 milligram dose of 
midazolam to effectively paralyze the brain, a phenomenon which is not 
anesthesia but does have the effect of shutting down respiration and eliminating 
the individual’s awareness of pain. The dosage at which the ceiling effect may 
occur at the spinal cord level is unknown because no testing to ascertain the 
level at which the ceiling effect occurs has been documented. 
Id. 
 184. Id. at 42.  
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B. Does Midazolam Have an Analgesic Effect? 
The experts further disagreed on the second pharmacological property of 
whether midazolam has an “analgesic effect” and will thus inhibit the 
sensation of the painful stimuli during the execution. Midazolam affects the 
chemical binding of the gamma-aminobutyric acid (“GABA”) receptors, 
which inhibits the flow of electrical impulses in the neurons in the central 
nervous system. According to Dr. Evans, this inhibiting function would 
“prevent the reaction, the painful stimuli.”185 Dr. Lubarsky provided a 
distinguishing point on GABA activity: although midazolam does bind to 
GABA receptors to induce unconsciousness, “it does not have any effect to 
produce deep anesthetic states.”186 The petitioner’s experts affirmed that 
potassium chloride’s noxious stimuli to render death pulls the inmate out of 
unconsciousness so that he possesses sentience and experiences 
excruciating pain. In his report, Dr. Sasich went further when he stated that 
“midazolam increases the perception of pain” and that GABA “receptor 
agonists such as midazolam have been shown to enhance pain.”187  
If midazolam is ineffective, its failure will be obscured by the 
vecuronium bromide, which paralyzes the prisoner and renders him unable 
to convey the trauma that is occurring within his body to those witnessing 
the execution. Dr. Lubarsky affirmed in his report that “[t]he only purpose 
of the administration of the vecuronium bromide is to make the execution 
more aesthetically pleasing to observers in that it reduces the ability of the 
individual being executed to move or show any pain associated with the 
execution process.”188 Even in the presence of this deprecating observation, 
                                                                                                                 
 185. Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 345, 2014 at 
648, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014). 
 186. Dr. Evans affirmed in oral examination, “Midazolam attaches to GABA receptors, 
inhibiting GABA.” Id. at 637. Further, Dr. Evans indicated a 500mg dose of midazolam will 
inhibit GABA with the result being that the condemned “[w]ould not sense the pain.” Id. at 
640.  
 187. Expert Report of Larry D. Sasich, supra note 169, at 4 (citing M.A. Frolich et al., 
Effect of Sedation on Pain Perception, 118 ANESTHESIOLOGY 611 (2013)).  
 188. Expert Report of David A. Lubarsky, supra note 169, at 4. In considering the State 
of Oklahoma’s use of vecuronium bromide, Austin Sarat is apposite here when he stated that 
science in executions “mediates between the state and death by masking physical pain and 
allowing citizens to imagine that state killing is painless.” AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE 
KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN CONDITION 64 (2001). According to 
Timothy Kaufman-Osborn, the state’s quixotic maintenance of lethal injection is contingent 
upon the administration of effective pharmacological substances to render a body “that does 
not writhe uncontrollably, that does not emit unseemly noises, that does not jettison nasty 
fluids,” in order to ensure against any claims of barbarism inherent within executions. 
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however, the complex issue of the analgesic effect for pain relief was 
swiftly dispensed within Judge Friot’s finding that in the administration of 
the exponential dose (of 500mg), there will be an elimination of the 
“individual’s awareness of pain.”189 This finding on the phenomenon of 
pain is difficult to reconcile with the science. There was an insufficient 
engagement with the claim that midazolam has a weak effect as a receptor 
agonist and thus chemically contributes to increased pain perception of the 
noxious effects of the potassium chloride. The vecuronium bromide will 
primarily mask the presence of the internal trauma and thus make opaque 
the failure of midazolam to act as an anesthetic. This part of the judgment 
provided a substandard application of scientific methodology to interpret 
the data presented to the court and does not adequately reveal why the 
adverse reactions identified by Drs. Lubarsky and Sasich, would not occur. 
C. Does Midazolam Produce Paradoxical Reactions? 
The third pharmacological issue centered on the possibility that 
midazolam could induce a “paradoxical effect,” in that the drug does not 
work as intended. Dr. Sasich stated that “the professional product label for 
midazolam warns of paradoxical reactions.”190 Dr. Lubarsky affirmed that 
these reactions occurred in “vulnerable populations,” which includes “the 
elderly, people with a history of aggression, impulsivity, alcohol abuse or 
other psychiatric disorders,” and “it manifest[s] in many ways such as 
hyperactivity and restlessness.”191 What is most damning for Oklahoma’s 
use of an exponential dose of 500mg is that when paradoxical reactions 
occur, they are “not attended by the expected sedative effects,” but “are 
addressed by reversal of midazolam, not further administration.”192 Thus it 
                                                                                                                 
TIMOTHY V. KAUFMAN-OSBORN, FROM NOOSE TO NEEDLE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE 
LATE LIBERAL STATE 182 (2005).  
 189. Court’s Ruling Preliminary Injunction at 43, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F 
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014), 2014 WL 10741415. 
 190. Expert Report of Larry D. Sasich, supra note 169, at 4. The Professional Product 
Label for Midazolam states: 
Reactions such as agitation, involuntary movements (including tonic/clonic 
movements and muscle tremor), hyperactivity and combativeness have been 
reported in both adult and pediatric patients. These reactions may be due to 
inadequate or excessive dosing or improper administration of midazolam; 
however, consideration should be given to the possibility of cerebral hypoxia or 
true paradoxical reactions. 
Id.  
 191. Expert Report of David A. Lubarsky, supra note 164, at 3.  
 192. Id. See also Expert Report of Larry D. Sasich, supra note 166, at 5 (citing Carissa E. 
Mancuso et al., Paradoxical Reactions to Benzodiazepines: Literature Review and 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
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is the cessation of the administration of midazolam that would neutralize 
cruel manifestations in the punishment, but Oklahoma does the opposite. It 
injects more.193  
Judge Friot did identify the risks. However, he went on to state that the 
product label for midazolam demonstrates “[t]he likelihood that a 
paradoxical reaction will occur in any particular instance is speculative, but 
it occurs with the highest frequency in low therapeutic doses. Dr. Evans 
estimated that with a low therapeutic dose of midazolam there would be 
less than a one percent incidence of a paradoxical reaction.”194 The district 
court did not provide a clear explanation as to why Drs. Sasich and 
Lubarsky were “speculative” in their reports and testimony, or why Dr. 
Evans’s reasoning of an estimation was acceptable. Judge Friot simply 
stated it as a fact or as a manifestation of judicial discretion, immunizing 
the adjudication from the need to provide a reasonable explanation.   
There are significant reasons to argue that even though the district court 
cited the FRE and Daubert, it failed to apply adequate review mechanisms 
to the Warner evidentiary hearing.195 It appears that the court paid lip 
service to the evidentiary standards without utilizing them in a fair and 
evenhanded way. This poses serious questions concerning whether the court 
applied an appropriate adjudicative methodology for discerning if 
midazolam has a ceiling effect, whether it possesses analgesic properties, 
and to what extent it produces paradoxical reactions within the person being 
                                                                                                                 
Treatment Options, 24 PHARMACOTHERAPY 1177, 1177-85 (2004); Young Hee Shin et al., 
The Effect of Midazolam Dose and Age on the Paradoxical Midazolam Reaction in Korean 
Pediatric Patients, 65 KOREAN J. ANESTHESIOLOGY 9, 9-13 (2013); Chandra R. Rodrigo, 
Flumazenil Reverses Paradoxical Reaction with Midazolam, 38 ANESTHESIA PROGRESS 65, 
65-68 (1991)).  
 193. In his report, Dr. Sasich cited peer reviewed scientific investigations on the 
paradoxical effect of midazolam and affirmed that in an experiment, “[a]s the total dose of 
midazolam increased, symptoms of the paradoxical reaction became worse.” Expert Report 
of Larry D. Sasich, supra note 169, at 5. 
 194. Court’s Ruling Preliminary Injunction at 44, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F 
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014), 2014 WL 10741415 (emphasis added).  
 195. Such adjudicative resistance is consistent with David Bernstein’s analysis of the 
judicial “counterrevolution” to the tightening of the review and admissibility standards under 
the FRE and the Daubert-trilogy, and he notes that “many federal courts resisted” these rules 
of evidence, and “[a] few sought to retain the old let-it-all-in rules,” Bernstein, supra note 
132, at 50. Such courts sought to operate under the preceding guidance of Frye v. United 
States, in which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia established the rule for 
admissibility as being to “admit[] expert testimony so long as [the] thing from which the 
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the 
particular field in which it belongs.” 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
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executed. A review of the flawed scientific methodology by the district 
court is provided below. 
D. The Scrutiny of the Expert’s Scientific Methodology 
At various moments in the Warner evidentiary hearing, the experts 
conceded that there was no available data to support the State of 
Oklahoma’s claims concerning the drug’s efficacy for lethal injection. By 
way of example of this specific lacuna in response to the petitioner’s 
scientific findings, Dr. Evans stated that the paradoxical effect would only 
occur in one percent of cases, but he stated that “[t]here are really no 
studies that I’m aware of”196 on the paradoxical reaction. Plaintiff’s 
counsel, Robin Konrad, questioned Dr. Evans on this claim in cross-
examination, and in viewing the possibility of the paradoxical reaction, Dr. 
Evans stated, “I don’t think it’s likely to happen.”197 Ms. Konrad then 
asked, “what are you basing your opinion on?”198 and the answer was that 
“it’s basically shutting down the central nervous system.”199 As Ms. Konrad 
was speaking to Dr. Evans’s methodology, she pressed further in this line of 
questioning and asked him whether he was aware of the scholarship that 
was cited by Dr. Sasich in his report. She pointed Dr. Evans to page five of 
Dr. Sasich’s report and asked, “have you reviewed those case studies that 
are cited there?”200 The answer was, “[n]o. No, I have not.”201 It is clear that 
there were significant unanswered questions concerning the complex data 
and methodology on the paradoxical reaction. In another example, Ms. 
Konrad cross-examined Dr. Evans on the purported ceiling effect and he 
answered, “[t]here is no data that suggests that there is or there isn’t.”202 In 
                                                                                                                 
 196. Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 641, Warner 
v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014).  
 197. Id. at 669.  
 198. Id.  
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. at 670. The studies included: Mancuso, supra note 192; Shin, supra note 192; 
and Rodrigo, supra note 192.  
 201. Id.  
 202. Id. at 664. Similarly, Ms. Konrad asked Dr. Evans, “How do you know how long 
would it take for the effects of those drugs [500 milligrams of midazolam and 500 
milligrams of hydromorphone] to cause death?” Id. at 666. Dr. Evans answered, “Well, there 
really isn’t much concrete data about this.” Id. Dr. Evans later discussed the 500 milligram 
dose of midazolam and stated, “I don’t think anyone would be able to sustain life with that 
kind of dose on board.” Id. at 667. Ms. Konrad replied, “You say you don’t think, but do you 
know? Is there any data to show[?]” Id. The answer was, “No.” Id. Then the question was 
asked whether 500 milligrams of midazolam would cause death. Id. Dr. Evans answered:  
Only – no, not – yeah, the dose itself, 500 milligrams, there is nothing out there 
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providing the court with his data-collection methodology, Dr. Evans stated 
that “we’re essentially extrapolating this piece and saying that there is a 
linear effect in terms of administration of the drug and the concentrations 
you can receive centrally, [and] it makes sense, it’s a logical assumption to 
make in this case.”203  
The source of this “extrapolation,” “mak[ing] sense,” and “logical 
assumption,” was primarily from the generic information on the Material 
Safety Data Sheet204 and the website, drugs.com,205 which is a web-based 
tertiary resource for providing basic information on drugs to the general 
public. For Dr. Evans, these appeared to be reasonable scientific sources 
upon which to base his highly complex pharmacological findings in a 
capital case. Dr. Sasich is an expert in drug safety information and is a 
member of an advisory committee to the FDA.206 In contrast, he stated that 
he would not rely on these generic resources to engage with complex 
pharmacology, and concerning drugs.com,207 Dr. Sasich stated that it uses 
“a number of other sources, for instance, Micromedex, Epocrates, [and] 
Lexi-Comp. Those publications or those products have been criticized in 
the peer-reviewed medical literature for poor editorial policies, including 
being out of date and incomplete.”208 
                                                                                                                 
in the literature that looks at 500 milligrams. There’s lots of literature to 
suggest that lower doses of the drug will cause death, so if we’re essentially 
extrapolating this piece and saying there is a linear effect in terms of 
administration of the drug and the concentrations you can receive centrally, 
then it makes sense, it’s a logical assumption to make in this case.  
Id. at 667-68.  
 203. Id. at 667-68.  
 204. See MSDS SOLUTIONS CENTER, http://www.msds.com/ (last visited May 12, 2017) 
(providing information on the Material Data Safety Sheets). 
 205. See DRUGS.COM, https://www.drugs.com/ (last visited May 12, 2017); see also 
Michael S. Leonard, Justices Uphold Oklahoma Lethal Injection, Tightening Standards for 
Death Penalty Plaintiffs, WESTLAW J. HEALTH L., July 7, 2015, 23 No. 03 WJHTH 9. 
 206. Dr. Sasich stated that his professional experience included “[s]erving as a Consumer 
Representative on the Science Board of Food and Drug Administration, an advisory 
committee to the FDA Commissioner.” Expert Report of Larry D. Sasich, supra note 169, at 
1.  
 207. Ms. Konrad asked, “Would you rely on a source such as drugs.com?” to which Dr. 
Sasich answered, “No, I wouldn’t. And I would probably not accept a work product from a 
student that provided me a report where drugs.com was used as the reference source.” 
Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 336, Warner v. 
Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014).  
 208. Id.  
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Dr. Sasich provided the court with a detailed methodology for extracting 
information on pharmacology and stated that the “[p]rofessional product 
labels” were the appropriate sources of information for determining the 
characteristics and usage(s) of a drug because “scientific studies have been 
submitted and reviewed by the FDA before any information can actually go 
into a professional product label.”209 Dr. Lubarsky agreed with Dr. Sasich’s 
observations in oral testimony,210 and in his report he stated that 
“[m]idazolam is not FDA-approved as the sole drug to produce and 
maintain anesthesia in minor surgical procedures,”211 in which he cited a 
peer-reviewed article from the journal Anesthesiology to affirm this 
proposition.212 Dr. Evans offered his observations concerning generalized 
claims that deaths had resulted from large doses of midazolam,213 but Dr. 
Lubarsky gave a nuanced explanation in oral testimony that “it is a true 
statement, but the part that’s left out is that those types of fatalities occur in 
90-year-olds with congestive heart failure who have not had careful titration 
of the drug.”214  
In his report, Dr. Lubarsky discussed the problems with the executions of 
Clayton Lockett in the State of Oklahoma and Joseph Wood in the State of 
Arizona as examples of qualitative methodology and data.215 Dr. Lubarsky 
identified the procedural complications that the execution team experienced 
in establishing venous access and the problems with the chemical effects 
within Lockett’s body, and ultimately he found that the use of midazolam 
as the first drug in Oklahoma’s execution protocol “creates a significant 
                                                                                                                 
 209. Id. 
 210. Dr. Lubarsky testified that midazolam “was not approved by the FDA as a sole 
anesthetic because after the use of fairly large doses that were sufficient to reach the ceiling 
effect and produce induction of unconsciousness, the patients responded to the surgery.” Id. 
at 127.  
 211. Expert Report of David A. Lubarsky, supra note 167, at 2.  
 212. Id. at 2-3 (citing Reves et al, supra note 23, at 310-24). 
 213. Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 633, Warner 
v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014).  
 214. Id. at 124.  
 215. Dr. Lubarsky and Dr. Sasich were speaking on behalf of the future pain, as an 
example of Timothy Kaufman-Osborn’s observations of “the troublesome role of the human 
body in contemporary capital punishment.” KAUFMAN-OSBORN, supra note 188, at 182. 
Elaine Scarry is also reflective of the observations (and the role) of the petitioner’s experts 
when she stated that “[b]ecause the person in pain is ordinarily so bereft of the resources of 
speech, it is not surprising that the language for pain should sometimes be brought into being 
by those who are not themselves in pain but who speak on behalf of those who are.” ELAINE 
SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD 6 (1985).  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
588 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:545 
 
 
risk of serious harm to condemned prisoners.”216 On July 23, 2014, Arizona 
botched the execution of Joseph Wood.217 Arizona adopted the use of 
750mg of midazolam (which is 250mg more than Oklahoma), but the 
source of the execution drugs were kept secret and there was insufficient 
information on the training of the execution personnel. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted a stay of execution,218 but 
the Supreme Court lifted the stay and allowed the secrecy of the Arizona 
protocol to remain.219 Nonetheless, the torturous manifestations of Wood’s 
execution emerged and revealed that he was injected fifteen times, he 
struggled against the restraints and gasped for air, and it was about one hour 
and fifty-seven minutes before he died.220 In the Warner evidentiary 
hearing, Dr. Lubarsky was asked about the effectiveness of 750mg of 
midazolam to induce and maintain unconsciousness, and he stated Wood’s 
execution in Arizona was  
unintentional experimental proof that large doses of midazolam do 
not necessarily kill you, make you guarantee unconsciousness, and 
that the administration of additional doses do not cause further 
depression of consciousness or Mr. Wood would have stopped 
breathing and would have gone into a coma were such large doses 
are actually effective.221 
It therefore becomes difficult to understand the district court’s selective 
reasoning on the pharmacological science for the execution protocol. 
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Landrigan v. Brewer222 affirmed the 
district court’s finding of an “unconstitutional risk of harm flowing from 
the state’s proposed use of drugs from a foreign source that was not 
approved by the FDA.”223 If the probative fact is FDA approval through the 
granting of a license (for a foreign or domestically manufactured drug), a 
logical application of this rule would be that it prima facie favors Drs. 
                                                                                                                 
 216. Expert Report of David A. Lubarsky, supra note 167, at 6.  
 217. Tom Dart, Arizona Inmate Joseph Wood Was Injected 15 Times with Execution 
Drugs, GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2014 10:40 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/ 
02/arizona-inmate-injected-15-times-execution-drugs-joseph-wood.  
 218. Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076, 1088 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 219. Ryan v. Wood, 135 S. Ct. 21 (2014).  
 220. Dart, supra note 217. 
 221. Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 130, Warner 
v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014). 
 222. 625 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 223. Court’s Ruling on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 61, Warner v. 
Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014), 2014 WL 10741415.  
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss4/1
2017]        OKLAHOMA’S LETHAL INJECTION PROTOCOL 589 
 
 
Lubarsky and Sasich, as they were the experts who affirmed that the FDA 
had not provided a license for midazolam to be used as an anesthetic in 
minor surgical procedures. If the basic question is whether the FDA has 
approved midazolam to act as an anesthetic for punishment procedures (for 
example, in executions), the answer is “no.” The significance of this lacuna 
is strengthened by the Supreme Court’s vacating of stay in Brewer v. 
Landrigan,224 when the Court held that the district court “was left to 
speculate as to the risk of harm. But speculation cannot substitute for 
evidence that the use of the drug is sure or very likely to cause serious 
illness and needless suffering.”225 If the rule is established that 
“speculation” is rendered when an expert provides evidence that a drug will 
perform in a way that the FDA has not accepted and thus endorsed through 
a license, then it is clear that this applies to the State of Oklahoma’s claim 
and not to that of the petitioners. The State was providing the greatest 
degree of subjectivity concerning the evidence. The petitioner pointed to 
the lacunae.    
There are significant grounds for arguing that the district court failed to 
adequately apply Rule 702 within the Warner evidentiary hearing, and it is 
argued here that (a) the evidence presented did not amount to “sufficient 
facts or data;”226 (b) it did not adhere to the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Joiner, which held that there must not be “too great an analytical gap 
between the data and the opinion proffered;”227 and (c) it did not meet the 
Tenth Circuit’s standard from Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. 
that the judge must “assess the reasoning and methodology” of the 
scientist’s opinion to “determine whether it is scientifically valid and 
applicable.”228 The district court meandered around the scientific evidence 
of Drs. Lubarsky and Sasich and applied judicial reductivism to make the 
science fit within the confines of a constitutional death penalty.229 The court 
seemed to adopt a judicial atomistic approach for an “assessment of a piece 
                                                                                                                 
 224. Brewer v. Landrigan, 562 U.S. 996 (2010) (Mem.).  
 225. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 226. FED. R. EVID. 702(b). 
 227. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146. 
 228. 215 F.3d 1083, 1087 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that Daubert’s gatekeeping function 
“requires the judge to assess the reasoning and methodology underlying the expert’s opinion, 
and determine whether it is scientifically valid and applicable to a particular set of facts”). 
 229. The court did so in a way which is consistent with the observations of the moral 
philosopher, Mary Midgley, who observed that “reductionism,” imposed by social/political 
institutions, is an exercise in, “reshaping [of the] intellectual landscape.” MARY MIDGLEY, 
THE MYTHS WE LIVE BY 43 (2011). 
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of evidence in a relative vacuum.”230 The district court committed a “false 
positive error,”231 as it has unjustifiably provided a scientific overstatement 
to frame the pharmacology of midazolam and packaged it, cut off the 
boundaries of uncertainty232 affirmed by the absence of an FDA license, 
and accepted the State’s speculation to render a death penalty judicially and 
legislatively imaginable.  
This flawed reasoning, and thus, false comity, is consistent with 
Jonathan Maur and Lisa Larrimore Oullette’s study on deference mistakes 
by district and appellate courts, and one contributing factor is the 
demonstration of a “pro-government” discretion.233 The district court 
applied a subjective management of the science to curtail the probative 
elements of the petitioner’s position in order to “restore order” within 
Oklahoma’s capital judicial system.234 The main interpretive mechanism to 
                                                                                                                 
 230. Mnookin, supra note 20, at 1534.  
 231. Michael Traynor, Communicating Scientific Uncertainty: A Lawyer’s Perspective, 
45 Envtl. L. Rep.: News & Analysis (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10159, 10164 (2015), 45 ENVLRNA 
10159 (Westlaw). Traynor stated, “Varying standards of proof bear on the level of tolerable 
uncertainty; for example ‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’ ‘clear and convincing,’ and 
‘preponderance of the evidence.’” Id. Professor David Faigman observed (in a personal 
communication to Traynor) that 
the difference in standards . . . . “relates to the problem of balancing the 
likelihood of making false positive errors versus the prospect of making false 
negative errors. In criminal cases, the concern is with making false positive 
errors, thus resulting in a high burden of proof--and increasing the number of 
false negatives as a result.”  
Id.  
 232. Drs. Lubarsky and Sasich attempted to show the District Court that, at a minimum, 
there were levels of uncertainty within Oklahoma’s use of midazolam, and at a maximum, it 
was clear that torturous executions will be maintained. In presenting this information, the 
petitioner’s experts were reliable scientists informing the court of the very real presence of 
uncertainty which could reach to a significant probability that Oklahoma is wrong on the 
pharmacology of midazolam. According to Kenny Walker, if a scientist “can be accurate yet 
still use uncertainty to frame the impact, [they are] not only trustworthy, [they are] 
interesting, and…effectively shape the terms of debate. We’ve all got to stop ignoring 
uncertainty, and instead learn to manage it.” Kenny Walker, “Without Evidence, There Is No 
Answer’: Uncertainty and Scientific Ethos in the Silent Spring(s) of Rachel Carson, 2 
ENVTL. HUMANITIES 101, 114 (2013).  
 233. Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 643, 686 (2015).  
 234. Masur and Larrimore Oullette note that “deference mistakes are commonplace 
in . . . criminal procedure.” Id. at 731. Christina Boyd observes that within the appellate 
process, district court judges face potentially the most constraints upon their “decision-
making behavior,” and that their work can involve “a complex, dynamic case environment 
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produce this false comity and the packaging of the pharmacological science 
for a manageable judicial expression was through the doctrine of finality. 
E. Elevating the Doctrine of Finality to Neutralize Legitimate State Comity  
Judge Friot utilized an atomistic privileging of the State’s 
uncorroborated reasoning. It is reflective of the opinion of Michael Traynor, 
President Emeritus of the American Law Institute, who stated that “lawyers 
are experts at proceduralizing and compartmentalizing difficult problems. 
The legal system facilitates private ordering as well as the resolution of the 
disputes that come within it. Its main purpose is not the pursuit of scientific 
‘truth.’”235 If this procedural observation is correct, and it can be argued 
that “scientific truth” was not the primary aim of the district court, then 
what was the main purpose or “intention?”236 It appears that the 
adjudicative process adhered to the principle that has prominence at the end 
of the Warner judgment. The district court’s citation of the Baze v. Rees 
reasoning is telling in that 
an inmate cannot succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim 
simply by showing one more step the state could take as a fail-
safe for other independently adequate measures. This approach 
would serve no meaningful purpose and would frustrate the 
state’s legitimate interest in carrying out a sentence of death in a 
timely manner.237 
In affirmation:  
Plaintiffs have been successfully prosecuted, convicted, and 
sentenced to death in proceedings that have withstood decades of 
trials, direct review, and collateral review. The equities of the 
                                                                                                                 
that presents multiple decision-making opportunities.” Christina L. Boyd, The Hierarchical 
Influence of Courts of Appeals on District Courts, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 113, 114 (2015). 
 235. Traynor, supra note 231, at 10164 (“In general, courts, legislatures, and the legal 
profession attempt in various ways to address and communicate uncertainty, risk, 
unreliability, and incomplete information in a changing environment. They must do so 
within a system that has various objectives . . . includ[ing]: determining responsibility and 
resolving adversarial litigation with finality and transparency…ensuring the participants and 
the public a reasonable measure of fairness, acceptability, and predictability.”). 
 236. Consistent with this observation, Mary Midgley reminds us that “[t]he point is not 
just that [there are] ways of simplifying the conceptual scene. It concerns the intention that 
underlines that simplification.” Midgley, supra note 229, at 43.  
 237. Court’s Ruling Preliminary Injunction at 71, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F 
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014), 2014 WL 10741415 (emphasis added) (citing Baze v. Rees, 553 
U.S. 35, 60-61 (2008)). 
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matter strongly favor bringing their cases at long last to a 
conclusion by carrying out the penalty that the courts have 
determined to have been constitutionally imposed.238  
Here is the clear interaction of comity and finality. Comity is argued to 
have been facilitated through the “equities of the matter,” the “decades of 
trials,” and whilst this has suspended finality, it has done so for good 
reasons so as to provide an adjudicative process to legitimize state interests 
in the execution. Now, comity must give way to finality as “one more step” 
cannot be taken. The doctrine of finality is initiated following the comity 
review, and it steps in via the judicial declarations of the “timely manner” 
and to promote the “state’s legitimate interest” there is a need for a 
conclusion in the case. In promoting the finality interests here, the judicial 
process is trying to close the door in an attempt to put the petitioners “out of 
court and deny[] them the means of further” action.239  
There are significant questions concerning the efficacy of this process 
and the court’s framing of the interaction of comity and finality. In making 
its assessment on the comity and finality issues, the district court seemingly 
conflated the factual predicates of (a) the new judicial consideration of the 
pharmacology of midazolam within the amended execution protocol with 
(b) the guilt/innocence and sentencing issues of the petitioner’s capital 
bifurcated trial in 1997, then direct review, and the eighteen years of further 
collateral attack and habeas corpus appeals. There are significant reasons to 
believe that the conflation of these issues has led to an abuse of discretion, 
as the arguments concerning the change in the pharmacology used in 
executions were a novel issue before the court since the amendments to the 
Execution Protocol were only adopted in 2014. Therefore, it should have 
been kept as a separate issue which would have (reasonably) led to the 
determination that new testing of midazolam was required. However, in 
furtherance of false comity and an illegitimate application of the doctrine of 
finality, the district court cited two Supreme Court decisions:240 Nelson v. 
Campbell, in which the Court held that the State has “a significant interest 
in meting out a sentence of death in a timely fashion,”241 and Calderon v. 
Thompson, in which the Court held:  
                                                                                                                 
 238. Id. at 79-80 (emphasis added).  
 239. KEVIN F. ARTHUR, FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS AND OTHER APPELLATE TRIGGER ISSUES 
§ 4 (2014).  
 240. Court’s Ruling Preliminary Injunction at 80, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F 
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014), 2014 WL 10741415 (citing Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 
644 (2004); then citing Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 556 (1998)). 
 241. Nelson, 541 U.S. at 644. 
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When lengthy federal proceedings have run their course and a 
mandate denying relief was issued, finality acquires an added 
moral dimension. Only with an assurance of real finality can the 
state execute its moral judgment in a case. Only with real finality 
can the victims of crime move forward knowing the moral 
judgment will be carried out. To unsettle these expectations is to 
inflict a profound injury to the powerful and legitimate interest 
in punishing the guilty, an interest shared by the State and the 
victims of crime alike.242  
This section of the Calderon judgment is reflective of the bifurcated 
capital trial, the lengthy habeas corpus appeals, and the impact of the 
litigation on the victims of the crimes. It is not engaging with an evidentiary 
hearing considering for the first time an issue focusing on the 
constitutionality of the pharmacology used in a new execution protocol. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court affirmed that the doctrine of finality is 
fundamentally contingent upon the fulfillment of genuine comity as the 
“proceedings [need to] have run their course.”243 Thus, the “moral 
dimension” of finality can only be legitimately demonstrated once the 
comity interests have been adequately adjudicated, and consequently, “real 
finality” can only occur once genuine comity has been completed. The 
paradox is that if genuine comity takes its course, it is very likely that the 
finality of an execution in Oklahoma will not be upheld. Hence, the district 
court has used this citation from Calderon to incorrectly support the State’s 
position.244 The Supreme Court’s intended purpose is to ensure that before 
finality in an execution can be imposed, legitimate comity should have 
manifested. It hitherto had not occurred in the Warner litigation. Therefore, 
due to the lack of sufficient comity consideration by the district court in 
Warner, Calderon has been misapplied. Warner demonstrates that, in 
various ways, the Oklahoma capital judicial system is failing to implement 
constitutional comity review. 
Instead of providing a legitimate basis for finality to promote a legitimate 
execution, Warner threw open more questions concerning the execution 
drugs than it answered. The next court that considered the issues and 
                                                                                                                 
 242. 523 U.S. 538, 556 (1998) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (quoting 
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 421 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).  
 243. Id.  
 244. Court’s Ruling Preliminary Injunction at 80, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F 
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014), 2014 WL 10741415 (citing Calderon v. Thompson 523 U.S. 
538, 556 (1998)).  
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attempted to provide adequate explanations was the Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit. 
V. Finality and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
The petitioners filed for a preliminary injunction in the Tenth Circuit on 
the grounds that the district court had deferentially abused its discretion.245 
The case considered whether (a) following the Department of Public 
Safety’s independent review, there was a substantial risk that midazolam 
would be negligently administered;246 and (b) conducting executions using 
the changing array of untested drugs amounted to biological 
experimentation.247 The Tenth Circuit reviewed these issues following the 
acknowledgment that Clayton Lockett’s execution “though ultimately 
successful, was a procedural disaster.”248 So there were significant reasons 
for the court to apply a close reading of the district court’s application of 
the FRE and the Daubert assessment concerning the parameters of judicial 
discretion. 
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged the district court’s Daubert proceedings 
and stated that under the abuse of discretion standard, the court will 
“reverse only if the district court’s conclusion is arbitrary, capricious, 
whimsical or manifestly unreasonable or when [it is] convinced that the 
district court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of 
permissible choice in the circumstances.”249 These adjectives for 
assessment—“arbitrary” and “capricious,” for example—complement the 
                                                                                                                 
 245. See Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721 (10th Cir. 2015). The petitioners were twenty-
one Oklahoma death row inmates, led by Charles Warner, Richard Glossip, John Grant, and 
Benjamin Cole, bringing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the 
State of Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol. Id. at 723.  
 246. Id. at 727. Chief Judge Briscoe identified the first substantive issue for the Tenth 
Circuit to consider was whether “there is a substantial risk that midazolam will, as 
exemplified by the Lockett execution, be negligently administered and thus result in an 
inmate consciously experiencing the painful effects of the second and third drugs utilized in 
the execution protocol.” Id.  
 247. Id. Chief Judge Briscoe identified the second substantive issue to be determined was 
whether the use of midazolam amounted to experimentation on captive human subjects “[b]y 
attempting to conduct executions with an ever-changing array of untried drugs of unknown 
provenance, using untested procedures, . . . are engaging in a program of biological 
experimentation on captive and unwilling human subjects.” Id. (alteration and omission in 
original) (citation omitted).  
 248. Id. at 725.  
 249. Id. at 733-34 (quoting United States v. Avitia-Guillen, 680 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th 
Cir. 2012)).  
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analysis of “clear error” and the circumstances “exceeding the boundaries 
of permissible choice.” An array of options was affirmed which prima facie 
provided for a wide due process review. It would appear that following the 
denial of the petitioner’s claims by the district court, the State would have a 
higher burden to meet in the Tenth Circuit’s assessment of the State’s 
reliance on one pharmacologist’s scantly supported assertions on the 
biological effect of midazolam. The presence of the alternative science 
placed before it by the petitioner’s two experts, and the scholarly 
publications in support of the data rejecting the use of midazolam as an 
effective anesthetic, should reasonably have become probative to cast doubt 
upon the State’s position. However, a seeming aberrant reasoning occurred.  
The Tenth Circuit accepted the State’s expert without a detailed 
consideration of the petitioner’s experts, Drs. Lubarsky and Sasich, and it 
concluded that Dr. Evans’s “testimony was the product of reliable 
principles and methods reliably applied to the facts of this case.”250 This 
reasoning followed the affirmation that “plaintiffs point to what they 
perceive as a number of errors in Dr. Evans’s testimony,” and—following 
juridical observations on the general legal arguments, but without detailed 
engagement with the propositions of science—concluded that “these errors 
were not sufficiently serious to render unreliable Dr. Evans’ testimony . . . 
or to persuade [the court] that the district court’s decision to admit Dr. 
Evan’s testimony amounted to an abuse of discretion.”251 The court did 
recognize that the State’s witness’ possible deficiencies included the 
reported toxic dose range of midazolam, the cogency of the assertion that 
Material Safety Data Sheets are sufficient for FDA requirements, and the 
presence of conflicting expert testimony concerning whether midazolam 
inhibits GABA activity.252 These complex issues, however, were swiftly 
dealt with by the Tenth Circuit253 without any adequately documented 
holistic balancing of the alternative viewpoints provided by the petitioners.  
The Tenth Circuit’s decision inadequately engaged with the significance 
of these errors highlighted by the testimony and reports of Drs. Lubarsky 
and Sasich (as detailed in Part IV above). It did not reveal how the 
petitioners’ experts were less probative, or how Dr. Evans’s opinions were 
of a clearer scientific quality making his methodology and data 
authoritative for the appellate reasoning. It is therefore difficult to 
understand how the Tenth Circuit’s decision is not arbitrary or a very lax 
                                                                                                                 
 250. Id. at 734.  
 251. Id. (emphasis added). 
 252. Id. at 735.  
 253. Id. at 735-36. 
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application of the review standards. What we are left with is an atomistic 
determination. The Tenth Circuit’s decision galvanized a legal process that 
reduces the pharmacological science in curtailing the holistic consideration 
for adequately weighing the conflicting testimony of the petitioner’s 
experts.254 This perpetuates the packaging of the science to achieve a 
result—in this case, marching the petitioner to the death chamber. Both the 
district court and the Tenth Circuit failed to adequately assess the 
“underlying reasoning” and “methodology” proscribed by the FRE.  
Following this inadequate scientific evaluation, the Tenth Circuit makes 
two self-reflective claims concerning the quality of its own review in this 
case. The judgment states that “[a]fter carefully examining the record on 
appeal, we are unable to say that any of these factual findings are clearly 
erroneous,”255 and in footnote 10, it states that “[i]n an abundance of 
caution, this opinion was circulated to all active judges of this court prior to 
publication. No judge requested a poll on the questions presented by 
plaintiffs.”256 Considering the volume of expert evidence that the petitioners 
presented, it is difficult to accept such qualitative observations on the 
court’s own role and performance. It would have benefitted the Tenth 
Circuit judgment if an extensive review of the complicated scientific claims 
of Drs. Lubarsky and Sasich were set out in the adjudication and clear 
reasoning applied as to why their methodology and data was incorrect. This 
would have enabled the reader of the judgment to consider a transparent 
weighing of the major factors of the scientific claims. Applying a holistic 
review of the evidence and the appellate judgment, it is argued that the 
Tenth Circuit failed to present the full reach of the competing scientific 
claims. An appropriate conclusion of this federal review is that the 
judgment was founded upon an overreliance on the State’s one expert and 
applying insufficient and underdeveloped scientific propositions, the State’s 
position was accepted and affirmed.  
Perhaps it could be claimed that the Tenth Circuit’s self-affirmation of its 
own (inadequate) methodology is an example of the defensive rhetoric of 
Queen Gertrude in Hamlet when she claimed, “The lady doth protest too 
much, methinks.”257 The proclamation of too many vows (solemn promises) 
                                                                                                                 
 254. Id.  
 255. Id. at 735. 
 256. Id. at 736 n.10.  
 257. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 3, sc. 2. The emotional observation is by 
Queen Gertrude, who whilst watching the play The Mouse-Trap with Hamlet, provides this 
rather defensive line to reveal that she thought that in real life the opposite is true (in this 
case too many vows to be kept by a queen to a king). See id. Hamlet has many underlying 
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can lead the hearer (or reader) to conclude that in real life, the position is 
unrealistic, or in fact, the opposite did, does, or will occur.  
The judgement of the Tenth Circuit, however, is not the end of the 
matter, as the adjudication reducing the science was challenged in the 
Supreme Court in the presence of another example of a torturous execution. 
The highest court in the land received the benefit of further supporting 
pharmacological evidence of the inappropriateness of midazolam for 
executions. 
VI. The SCOTUS Decision in Glossip v. Gross 
A. The Brief of the Sixteen Professors of Pharmacology as Amicus Curiae 
After the completion of the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety’s 
investigations258 and the amendment to Oklahoma’s execution protocol,259 
Charles Warner was executed on January 15, 2015.260 Consistent with the 
legal arguments concerning the inadequacy of midazolam filed on his 
behalf, he complained that the drug injected into him “feels like acid,” and 
then exclaimed, “My body is on fire.”261 It was clear that further 
pharmacological investigations were required to understand the causes of 
this internal trauma. An opportunity was supplied in a writ for certiorari 
with Richard Glossip as the named first petitioner. In Glossip v. Gross,262 
the Supreme Court received additional expert opinions within various 
amicus curiae briefs,263 including a brief by sixteen professors of 
                                                                                                                 
pearls of wisdom for the study of law. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Shakespeare's Laws: A 
Justice, a Judge, a Philosopher, and an English Professor, in SHAKESPEARE AND THE LAW: A 
CONVERSATION AMONG DISCIPLINES AND PROFESSIONS 301-22 (Bradin Cormack et al. eds., 
2013) (discussing Hamlet). Hence, the claim is made that even though the Tenth Circuit 
provided to all of the judges an opportunity to read the case, it does not ipso facto equate to 
the affirmation that an accurate reading of the science had occurred. In fact, the argument of 
this article is that the opposite is the outcome.  
 258. See generally EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF EXECUTION OF CLAYTON LOCKETT, supra 
note 155.  
 259. See generally Okla. Dep’t of Corrections, supra note 6.  
 260. See Warner v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 824 (2015) (denying a stay of Warner’s execution).  
 261. Katie Fretland, Oklahoma Carries out First Execution Since Botched Execution in 
April, GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/16/oklahoma-
executes-charles-warner. 
 262. 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). 
 263. There were twelve amicus curiae briefs filed in Glossip v. Gross. See Glossip v. 
Gross, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/glossip-v-gross/ (last 
visited March 21, 2017).  
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pharmacology filed in support of neither party.264 This litigant-neutral brief 
firmly disagreed with the State’s reasoning concerning the use of 
midazolam in the execution protocol as the amici argued: 
From a pharmacological perspective . . . [m]idazolam is 
incapable of rendering an inmate unconscious prior to the 
injection of the second and third drugs in the State of 
Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol. Therefore, midazolam is 
not appropriate for its intended purpose as the first drug in the 
State of Oklahoma’s three-drug lethal injection protocol.265  
The amici’s scientific interpretation was contrary to the affirmation of 
the protocol within the preceding judicial determinations of the district 
court and the Tenth Circuit. They clearly set out the chemical interaction 
with the GABA receptors through the identified gradation of drugs as 
“agonists,” in that “when a drug activates its receptor . . . to produce a 
maximal effect [it] is called a full agonist; one that cannot produce the 
maximal effect is called a partial agonist.”266 It was argued that the drug 
does not produce a full agonistic inhibiting as “midazolam is only a partial 
agonist, and the depth of its inhibitory effect has limits,” and consequently, 
the identification of the difference between the agonistic scales reveals how 
midazolam has a “ceiling effect.”267 Taken on a holistic basis with the 
evidence of the three experts in the district court, it is reasonable to adduce 
that the objective, litigant-neutral clarity in the brief of the sixteen 
professors would have been persuasive.268 It was presented to the Supreme 
Court as clear and neutral scientific evidence that the inmate would be 
sentient and thus experience excruciating pain in the execution process. 
This is also consistent with what Charles Warner claimed he was subjected 
to during his execution. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 264. Brief of Sixteen Professors of Pharmacology as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, supra note 111.  
 265. Id. at 20-21.  
 266. Id. at 17-18.  
 267. Id. at 18.  
 268. It is also consistent with Seema Shah’s reasoning that “risk minimization likely puts 
extra scrutiny on particular aspects of execution by lethal injection. For instance, risk 
minimization may require Departments of Corrections to stop using the drug midazolam 
(which was implicated in three of the four botched executions that occurred in 2014).” 
Seema Shah, Experimental Execution, 90 WASH. L. REV. 147, 196-97 (2015).  
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss4/1
2017]        OKLAHOMA’S LETHAL INJECTION PROTOCOL 599 
 
 
B. The Majority Decision on the Pharmacology of Midazolam 
1. Justice Alito and the Efficacy of Midazolam 
In a five-four split decision, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, wrote the majority 
opinion and agreed with the Tenth Circuit’s affirmation of the district 
court’s holding on the constitutionality of using midazolam in Oklahoma’s 
lethal injection protocol.269 Justice Alito affirmed the efficacy of Dr. 
Evans’s testimony that “although midazolam is not an analgesic, it can 
nonetheless ‘render the person unconscious and “insensate” during the 
remainder of the procedure.’”270 Justice Alito followed the restrictive 
interpretive techniques of the district court and Tenth Circuit in privileging 
Dr. Evans’s testimony without providing any scientifically corroborated 
evidence that speaks directly to the process for maintaining 
unconsciousness.271 Concerning whether midazolam possesses a ceiling 
effect, Justice Alito stated that “[p]etitioners provided little probative 
evidence on this point, and the speculative evidence that they did present to 
the District Court does not come close to establishing that its factual 
findings were clearly erroneous.”272 There is no judicial explanation why 
Dr. Evans’s “propositions” were not speculative and why his evidence was 
immunized against effective FRE peer-review standards. However, it does 
not change the fact that the State’s position is contrary to Drs. Lubarsky and 
Sasich’s interpretation of the complex pharmacology, which is underpinned 
by the findings of the amicus curiae brief of the sixteen professors of 
pharmacology.273 Justice Alito inadequately engaged with the testimony 
and expert reports and did not provide a reasonable deconstruction of the 
“speculative evidence.”274 This reveals the dangers set by the district court 
                                                                                                                 
 269. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2730-31 (2015).  
 270. Id. at 2741 (citation omitted).  
 271. See id. at 2736.  
 272. Id. at 2743 (arguing that “Dr. Sasich stated in his expert report that the literature 
‘indicates’ that midazolam has a ceiling effect, but he conceded that he ‘was unable to 
determine the midazolam dose for a ceiling effect on unconsciousness because there is no 
literature in which such testing has been done’”). 
 273. See supra Section VI.A. 
 274. The significant body of medical opinion which is against the District Court’s 
decision has resulted in what the Honorable William J. Giacomo observed as the possibility 
of courts “admitting scientific testimony which is nonetheless unreliable or disputed in the 
scientific community.” Giacomo, supra note 141, at 24-25. Cassandra Welch’s observation 
of the quality of review is apposite, in that “under the Daubert trilogy, courts are free to use 
a flexible approach for all expert testimony in analyzing whether the proffered testimony is 
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precedent of an overstatement in science and it is subsequently very 
difficult to achieve an overruling of this initial reductive decision.  
The dissymmetry in favor of the State did not end there. The majority 
opinion also negated the probative value of the absence of the FDA license 
and only referred to the FDA in a citation by Dr. Sasich.275 Such 
adjudication is indicative of the disconcerting reasoning in Heckler v. 
Chaney, in which the Supreme Court refused to mandate that the FDA 
should “exercise its enforcement power to ensure that States only use drugs 
that are ‘safe and effective’ for human execution.”276 Heckler held that the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act could not be interpreted to extend the FDA’s 
role in regulating drugs trials—including those on prisoners and 
veterinarians putting animals to death—to the state use of pharmacology in 
the death penalty.277 Such reasoning is an example that the underlying 
evidentiary vicissitudes are ultimately framed within an adjudicative 
process in which the courts, not the FDA, have the monopoly review. 
Timothy Kaufman-Osborn argued that the Heckler decision “appears to 
censure a specific way of taking life.”278 We are left with the very 
unsatisfactory position where “the administrative agency authorized to 
protect persons from dangerous drugs”279 is not the institution that 
ultimately determines what is the appropriate pharmacology for use in the 
lethal injection process. The states and the courts can thus maintain an 
opaque covering over the torturous ending of life. 
2. Justice Alito on Scientific Methodology 
Justice Alito privileged for assessment the importance of the improved 
execution technology and procedures as “the Oklahoma protocol featured 
numerous safeguards, including the establishment of two IV access sites” 
and “confirmation of the viability of those sites.”280 The amicus curiae brief 
of the sixteen professors did not see the issue of the procedures 
implementing the execution techniques and technologies (for example, 
those of the Restraint Team and IV Team) as determinative, because to the 
                                                                                                                 
reliable knowledge,” and it appears that the majority have adhered to the rule that “lower 
courts are insulated from rigorous review by the abuse of discretion standard, which is 
applied in all determinations of whether an expert should be allowed to testify.” Welch, 
supra note 131, at 1090-91.  
 275. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2742 n.5.  
 276. 470 U.S. 821, 827 (1985).  
 277. See id. at 823, 837-38.  
 278. KAUFMAN-OSBORN, supra note 188, at 204. 
 279. Id.  
 280. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2736.  
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amici the foundational question for this litigation concerned the chemical 
composition of midazolam and its biological effects.281 So the important 
question was not how to get midazolam into the body, but what happens 
once it is injected. On this issue, the majority opinion was focused upon the 
wrong aspect of the execution.  
In further unsound methodology, Justice Alito sought to textually 
diminish the petitioner’s position by classifying their legal and scientific 
arguments as “little more than a quibble about the wording chosen by Dr. 
Evans” and as “simply quarrelling with the words that Dr. Evans used.”282 
Here, Justice Alito engaged with the arguments over midazolam’s ceiling 
effect and the inhibiting of the GABA receptors.283 As a principle of 
science, it is difficult to understand this etymological critique of the 
petitioners’ “words” used in their argument. In fact, this “quibble” was an 
engagement with the fundamental pharmacological questions, because 
following the clarification on the impact within the GABA receptors, the 
inhibiting function of midazolam is classified as only a partial agonist as 
opposed to a full agonist for an anesthetic effect.284 There is a real 
possibility that a surgical plane of unconsciousness will not be 
maintained.285 It is reasonable to state that the Supreme Court’s majority 
opinion undermined the methodological approaches of the “responsible 
scientist” on the anesthetic effect, and instead provided a way for law to 
manipulate scientific research on this important issue.286 In the evidentiary 
hearing, a holistic reading would prima facie demonstrate that the 
responsible scientific methodology, presentation of data, and identification 
of lacunae, came from the petitioners. Drs. Lubarsky and Sasich were the 
                                                                                                                 
 281. See Brief of Sixteen Professors of Pharmacology as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, supra note 111, at 10-11.  
 282. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2744.  
 283. Id.  
 284. See Brief of Sixteen Professors of Pharmacology as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, supra note 111, at 17-20. 
 285. See id. at 20. 
 286. This is a dangerous decision concerning the use of science by legal institutions, and 
one which is used to deny a true reflection of the epistemology of pharmacological science. 
Deborah M. Hussey Freeland states:  
A judge’s decision in litigation has the greatest chance of legitimacy and justice 
if it is based on our best knowledge, our most honest and accurate accounts of 
real-world events—if it is based on legally found facts of the highest 
epistemological quality. If a judge were to base his opinion on lies or 
misleading facts, our confidence in his ability to produce a fair decision would 
be lessened.  
Hussey Freeland, supra note 8, at 310.  
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experts who pointed to the unreliable scientific position within Oklahoma’s 
execution protocol, which was subsequently corroborated by the amicus 
curiae brief of the sixteen professors of pharmacology.287  
Anne Richardson Oakes and Haydn Davies affirm the importance of 
trust and confidence in the adjudicative process as the “acceptance of 
institutional legitimacy depends in large measure on the extent to which the 
procedures of the institution or decision-making body are perceived to be 
procedurally fair.”288 There is significant evidence to demonstrate that the 
litigation over Oklahoma’s protocol has been decided unfairly; at each stage 
of the appellate process the courts have failed to perform their procedural 
functions under the FRE and Daubert. Even worse, these legal results 
occurred despite the blatant evidence of the excruciating pain suffered by 
Wood, Lockett, and Warner. What Justice Alito’s judgment demonstrates is 
that if science is not yet able to give the capital judicial system the answer it 
wants, then even with the examples of inmates suffering excruciating pain 
and trauma, retentionist mechanisms can be implemented by the highest 
level of the judiciary to mold the science to protect the death penalty.  
A significant procedural technique for achieving this unsatisfactory 
result is placing the burden of proving that the pharmacology is inadequate 
onto the petitioner, and not the State. Justice Alito claimed:  
When a method of execution is authorized under state law, a 
party contending that this method violates the Eighth 
Amendment bears the burden of showing that the method creates 
an unacceptable risk of pain. Here, petitioners’ own experts 
effectively conceded that they lacked evidence to prove their 
case beyond dispute.289  
Dr. Sasich stated that in comparison to the practice of reliable scientific 
methodology, the burden of proof in the capital judicial process “has really 
turned the whole situation backwards in terms of trying to assess the safety 
and effectiveness of these drugs.”290 What remains is not a “pure science,” 
                                                                                                                 
 287. See Brief of Sixteen Professors of Pharmacology as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, supra note 111, at 18-20.  
 288. Anne Richardson Oakes & Haydn Davies, Process, Outcomes and the Invention of 
Tradition: The Growing Importance of the Appearance of Judicial Neutrality, 51 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 573, 573 (2011).  
 289. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2741.  
 290. See Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 357, 
Warner v. Gross, No. CIV-14-665F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014).  
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but a manifestation of what Sanne H. Knudsen describes as “policy-relevant 
science,” which is “shaped by institutional and political interests.”291  
The Glossip majority decision is reflective of Masur and Larrimore 
Ouellette’s observations on judicial deference mistakes, which have 
contributed to a “doctrinal creep by limiting the . . . substantive rights” of 
the petitioners.292 What occurred within the district court was that the 
“information-forcing function”293 of the evidentiary hearing had not 
achieved the desired result for the capital judicial system through revealing 
a clear picture of the pharmacology to put inmates to death. Rather than 
providing the truth of scientific uncertainty in a commendable service to the 
court, the petitioners’ experts merely became problematic for retentionist 
interests and their evidence needed to be distilled and rendered 
inapplicable. Knudsen notes that “[t]here are asymmetrical standards of 
transparency that apply to government science and private science,”294 and 
it is clear that the “private science” of midazolam for use in medical 
procedures requires FDA approval and appropriate testing, but the 
“government science” of midazolam for use in an execution is a much 
lower methodological and scrutiny threshold. From the perspective of 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, and in the presence of supporting amici, 
this makes the Supreme Court’s decision more damning than those of the 
district court and the Tenth Circuit. The highest court had the significant 
benefit of the scientific insights from the amicus curiae brief of the sixteen 
litigant-neutral pharmacologists, and thus had a clearer scientific position 
placed before it. For this stage in the appeal there was a total of eighteen 
pharmacologists with the opinion that midazolam is not an effective 
anesthetic for executions and only one pharmacologist who disagreed. 
However, the Supreme Court still applied the standards of confined 
government science promoted by the lone pharmacologist over the 
alternative corroborated opinions of the eighteen pharmacologists, and to 
demonstrate impartiality, sixteen were neutral to the proceedings of the 
case.   
The impetus for this abhorrent legal mechanism is therefore investigated. 
We need to discover the driving force molding the Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                                 
 291. Knudsen, supra note 10, at 1516.  
 292. See Masur & Larrimore Ouellette, supra note 233, at 674. The authors also state that 
when numerous courts make deference mistakes in habeas corpus petitions “the cumulative 
effect of such mistakes would be a systematic shrinking of federal rights.” Id. at 673.  
 293. Knudsen, supra note 10, at 1512-13 (highlighting the use of litigation as a way to 
engender scientific evidence).  
 294. Id. at 1533.  
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affirmation of such unsound pharmacological science. It appears that the 
determinative tool was the doctrine of finality, and we are now able to 
understand how the shadow of finality has been cast over the process from 
the beginning. It is a resolute presence throughout the genealogy of the 
judicial assessment of Oklahoma’s execution pharmacology. 
3. The Privileging of the Doctrine of Finality 
In affirming the district court’s reasoning, Justice Alito cited Baze v. 
Rees,295 which stated that allowing legal challenges solely as an avenue to 
show failsafe measures for adequate execution methods would “frustrate 
the State’s legitimate interest in carrying out a sentence of death in a timely 
manner.”296 This is an adjudicative concession to the jurisprudential corpus 
arising from the Herrera v. Collins binding of the doctrine of finality to 
capital cases,297 including the State’s “significant interest” standard in 
Nelson,298 and the “moral dimension” of finality, in that “[o]nly with an 
assurance of real finality can the State execute its moral judgment in a 
case.”299 Justice Alito asserted that “challenges to lethal injection protocols 
test the boundaries of the authority and competency of federal courts. 
Although we must invalidate a lethal injection protocol if it violates the 
Eighth Amendment, federal courts should not ‘embroil [themselves] in 
ongoing scientific controversies beyond their expertise.’”300 What is 
damaging to the process is that the pharmacology of midazolam has 
stretched the boundary of the federal judiciary’s competency, but instead of 
admitting a hitherto institutional incompetence and thus the need for further 
testing on the drug, the doctrine of finality has been adopted at all levels of 
the judiciary to manufacture a scientific position that packages the 
uncertainties of the pharmacological questions into a compartmentalized 
adjudicative result.301 The Glossip majority did nothing to dispel the fact 
                                                                                                                 
 295. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015) (citing Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 61 
(2008)). 
 296. Baze, 553 U.S. at 35, 61 (emphasis added).  
 297. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417.  
 298. Nelson, 541 U.S. at 644.  
 299. Calderon, 523 U.S. at 556.  
 300. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2740 (alteration in original) (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 51).  
 301. This is consistent with observations that institutions can hide behind the simulation 
of a pure scientific result, which is in reality a “science-laden policy decision[].” Holly 
Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 
1639-41, 1646 (2008). Sheila S. Jasanoff has argued that the processes for determining 
testing, methodology, and data in science during the regulatory process puts “unusual strains 
on science.” Jasanoff, supra note 12, at 195.  
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that “[a]dversarial science conjures images of bias[ed], agenda-driven 
outcomes.”302 It is evident that the doctrine of finality is a dominant 
component in the “machinery of death.”303  
Consequently, in the evolution of humane Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the Glossip minority opinion, written by Justice Sotomayor, 
provides the guiding moral and scientific light on this issue and renders 
transparent the failings of the majority opinion. 
C. Justice Sotomayor in Dissent  
1. Seeking Transparency of the Pharmacology of Midazolam 
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, which was joined by Justices Ginsberg, 
Breyer, and Kagan, sets out a holistic approach to the district court’s 
consideration of the expert evidence.304 It is clear to Justice Sotomayor that 
although there may have been a prima facie symmetrical weighing of each 
expert testimony throughout the appellate review, the final outcome is an 
unjustifiable dissymmetrical interpretive focus to illegitimately affirm the 
State’s position.305 The majority opinion “sweeps aside substantial 
evidence” of the petitioner’s experts, which showed that “while midazolam 
may be able to induce unconsciousness, it cannot be utilized to maintain 
unconsciousness in the face of agonizing stimuli.”306 Justice Sotomayor 
maintained that the majority followed the unsatisfactory district court 
opinion in affirming the “wholly unsupported claims that 500 milligrams of 
midazolam will ‘paralyz[e] the brain,’” and consequently the majority 
“disregards an objectively intolerable risk of severe pain.”307 The majority 
achieved this result “by deferring to the District Court’s decision to credit 
the scientifically unsupported and implausible testimony of a single expert 
witness,”308 because “Dr. Evans’ conclusions were entirely unsupported by 
any study or third-party source, contradicted by the extrinsic evidence 
proffered by petitioners, inconsistent with the scientific understanding of 
                                                                                                                 
 302. Knudsen, supra note 10, at 1556.  
 303. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also 
Michael Hintze, Tinkering with the Machinery of Death: Capital Punishment’s Toll on the 
American Judiciary, 89 JUDICATURE 254, 256-57 (2006).  
 304. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2780-81 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 305. See id. at 2781, 2797.  
 306. Id. at 2785.  
 307. Id. at 2785-86 (alterations in original).  
 308. Id. at 2781.  
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midazolam’s properties, and apparently premised on basic logical 
errors.”309  
Justice Sotomayor stated that “[g]iven these glaring flaws,” the district 
court judgment incorrectly elevated, and privileged, Dr. Evans’s evidence 
and, in effect, created the legal picture that the Court was presented with 
two equally plausible scientific perspectives on the pharmacology of 
midazolam.310 In Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, the Supreme Court 
stated, “Where there are two permissible views of the evidence” that have 
been presented to reasonably demonstrate “equal scientific weight,” then 
the court has a legitimate function in selecting one scientific body of 
opinion over the other.311 However, Justice Sotomayor was of the opinion 
that the district court had not been presented with two permissible views of 
equal scientific weight, because the State’s expert had “failed to tell ‘a 
coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic 
evidence.’”312 At best, what had occurred was that a hypothesis was 
proposed by Oklahoma through its execution protocol and was supported 
by Dr. Evans through scantly corroborated opinions. The district court 
accepted an insufficiently supported proposition, so the Supreme Court 
should not abdicate its “duty to examine critically the factual predicates.”313  
In placing the evidence within a holistic evaluation, it is clear that Justice 
Sotomayor engaged the evidentiary guidance of the FRE Rule 702, in that 
the State’s case had not presented sufficient scientific data, it was not a 
product of reliable principles and methods, and the science was not reliably 
applied to the case. In support of her nuanced understanding of the law and 
science, Justice Sotomayor demonstrated an acute appreciation of the issue 
of GABA receptors and the insufficient inhibiting function of midazolam, 
which is supported by the amicus brief of the sixteen professors of 
pharmacology:  
These inconsistencies and inaccuracies go to the very heart of 
Dr. Evans’ expert opinion, as they were the key components of 
his professed belief that one can extrapolate from what is known 
                                                                                                                 
 309. Id. at 2788.  
 310. See id. 
 311. 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985) (noting that two facially plausible stories “can virtually 
never be clear error”).  
 312. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2788 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. 
at 574-75). 
 313. Id. at 2786.  
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about midazolam’s effect at low doses to conclude that the drug 
would “paralyz[e] the brain” at Oklahoma’s planned dose.314  
To disprove this assertion, Justice Sotomayor cited the botched executions 
of Lockett and Wood.315 She stated that Lockett’s autopsy report 
determined “that the concentration of midazolam in Lockett’s blood was 
more than sufficient to render an average person unconscious.”316 
Concerning the execution of Wood, Justice Sotomayor argued that 
“[d]espite being given over 750 milligrams of midazolam, Wood gasped 
and snorted for nearly two hours. These reactions were, according to Dr. 
Lubarsky, inconsistent with Wood being fully anesthetized, and belie the 
claim that a lesser dose of 500 milligrams would somehow suffice.”317 
Furthermore, the improvements in the execution technologies would not 
rectify the inherent problems with the pharmacology, as she argued that  
none of the State’s “safeguards” for administering these drugs 
would seem to mitigate the substantial risk that midazolam will 
not work, as the Court contends. Protections ensuring that 
officials have properly secured a viable IV site will not enable 
midazolam to have an effect that it is chemically incapable of 
having.318  
Justice Sotomayor opined that an adjudicative error was made. In United 
States v. United States Gypsum Co., the Supreme Court held that clear error 
exists “when although there is evidence to support” a finding, “the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.”319 A holistic review of the 
evidence was provided to argue that the district court clearly erred in 
relying on the State’s singular scientific evidence. The majority opinion 
cited the three experts, but they did not provide an “entire review” that was 
necessary under Gypsum and the standards of review as guided by the FRE 
and Daubert. David Bernstein has argued that the Supreme Court should 
“step in at any time to reign in wayward circuits”320 in their misapplication 
of Rule 702, and this is what Justice Sotomayor and the minority tried to 
do. However, the majority opinion “has allowed lower court judges 
                                                                                                                 
 314. Id. at 2787 (alteration in original). 
 315. Id. at 2790-91.  
 316. Id. at 2782.  
 317. Id. at 2791 (internal citation omitted).  
 318. Id. (internal citation omitted).  
 319. 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 
 320. Bernstein, supra note 132, at 69.  
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significant latitude to ignore Rule 702,”321 or at least only pay lip service to 
the FRE while refusing to apply the codified evidentiary standards. 
2. The Alternative Execution Method Requirement 
Justice Sotomayor criticized the Glossip majority opinion for imputing 
the petitioner with a supposed Baze requirement of the need to identify an 
alternative execution method.322 She argued that the majority converted 
“this categorical prohibition into a conditional one. A method of execution 
that is intolerably painful—even to the point of being the chemical 
equivalent of burning alive—will, the Court holds, be unconstitutional if, 
and only if, there is a ‘known and available alternative’ method of 
execution.”323 The Baze holding on the “known-and-available-alternative 
requirement” was based on a weak constitutional foundation of a plurality 
opinion,324 which did not create a solid precedent value.325 There is a prior 
example of this rule in death penalty jurisprudence. In 1972, the case of 
Furman v. Georgia provided a plurality opinion that the state capital 
statutes allowed too much discretion to the legal fact finder and were thus 
unconstitutional, but the plurality holding did not agree on the boundaries 
and applicability of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishments or the scope of equal protection under law within the 
Fourteenth Amendment.326 Julian Killingley described the Furman 
judgment as an “anodyne per curiam opinion,”327 which consequently only 
suspended the death penalty in the United States, before the state capital 
statute’s deficiencies were perceived to be rectified by 1976 in Gregg v. 
Georgia.328 Therefore, the ratio of a judgment needs to be identified when 
plurality opinions are offered as precedent, and for guidance the Supreme 
Court stated in Marks v. United States that “the holding of the Court may be 
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds.”329  
                                                                                                                 
 321. Id.  
 322. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2793-94 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 323. Id. at 2793.  
 324. The plurality opinion judges were: Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Stevens, 
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).  
 325. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2793-94 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 326. See generally 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).  
 327. Julian Killingley, Constraining America’s Death Penalty: The Eighth Amendment 
and Excessive Punishment, in AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 106, at 127, 139.  
 328. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).  
 329. 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citation omitted). 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss4/1
2017]        OKLAHOMA’S LETHAL INJECTION PROTOCOL 609 
 
 
Justice Sotomayor stated that the Glossip majority unjustifiably deviated 
from the “narrowest grounds” principle, and thus “divines from Baze” that 
the petitioner must “prove the availability of an alternative means of 
execution,” and as such, it did not “represent the views of a majority of the 
Court”330 as is also required by CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of 
America.331 The plurality opinion in Baze only speaks to the per se 
constitutionality of the death penalty by lethal injection,332 and the 
alternative method is confined to the plurality holding and does not have the 
constitutional authority that the Glossip majority now seeks to impose upon 
the petitioners. It was thus wrongly decided and the district court made a 
deference mistake, which the majority now compounds.333 This is because 
the alternative method criteria is contingent upon the Supreme Court 
overruling Hill v. McDonough,334 which it did not do in Baze. In Hill, the 
Supreme Court held that in the plaintiff’s challenge to his execution under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil action for deprivation of rights 
including issues of prison confinement, he need not “identif[y] an 
alternative, authorized method of execution.”335 The Court affirmed that 
there was no constitutional basis for creating an “[i]mposition of heightened 
pleading requirements”336 upon the plaintiffs. Consequently, Justice 
Sotomayor reasoned that “[t]he Baze plurality opinion should not be 
understood to have so carelessly tossed aside Hill’s underlying premise.”337 
This reasoning finds support in the amicus curiae brief of the Louis Stein 
Center for Law and Ethics at Fordham University School of Law, which 
argued that in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 litigation the “challenges to lethal injection 
                                                                                                                 
 330. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2793 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 331. 481 U.S. 69, 81 (1987).  
 332. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2794 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 333. See Masur & Larrimore Ouellette, supra note 233, at 669-70. (The article engages 
with Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 2000), in which it was argued that both the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court of Ohio had made a deference 
mistake and wrongly applied the Supreme Court’s ruling in Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 
226 (1971)). Id. Britt established that “the State must . . . provide indigent prisoners with the 
basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to 
other prisoners.” Britt, 404 U.S. at 227.  
 334. 547 U.S. 573 (2006). 
 335. Id. at 582.  
 336. Id.  
 337. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2795 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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protocols should not be restricted to instances in which an inmate can 
identify a specific available alternative.”338  
To complete the deconstruction of the majority’s unsatisfactory 
reasoning on this issue, Justice Sotomayor stated that “[i]n reengineering 
Baze to support its newfound rule, the Court appears to rely on a flawed 
syllogism. If the death penalty is constitutional . . . then there must be a 
means of accomplishing it.”339 She continued to explain it is flawed because  
[i]f all available means of conducting an execution constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment, then conducting the execution 
will constitute cruel and usual punishment. Nothing compels a 
State to perform an execution. It does not get a constitutional 
free pass simply because it desires to deliver the ultimate 
penalty; its ends do not justify any and all means. If a State 
wishes to carry out an execution, it must do so subject to the 
constraints that our Constitution imposes on it, including the 
obligation to ensure that its chosen method is not cruel and 
unusual. Certainly the condemned has no duty to devise or pick a 
constitutional instrument of his or her own death.340 
Consequently, torturous levels are maintained within the capital judicial 
system, as Justice Sotomayor reasoned that “Oklahoma’s current protocol is 
a barbarous method of punishment—the chemical equivalent of being 
burned alive.”341 Significantly, for the constitutional arguments that analyze 
cruel and unusual punishments,  
it would not matter whether the State intended to use midazolam, 
or instead to have petitioners drawn and quartered, slowly 
tortured to death, or actually burned at the stake: because 
petitioners failed to prove the availability of sodium thiopental or 
pentobarbital, the State could execute them using whatever 
means it designated.342  
This is a damning indictment of the majority opinion.  
                                                                                                                 
 338. Brief for The Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics at Fordham University School 
of Law, supra note 109, at 31-32 (citing Hill, 547 U.S. at 580-81; and Jones v. Bock, 549 
U.S. 199, 213 (2007)). Jones stated that Hill “unanimously rejected a proposal that § 1983 
suits challenging a method of execution must identify an acceptable alternative.” Jones, 549 
U.S. at 213.  
 339. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2795 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 340. Id.  
 341. Id. 
 342. Id.  
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The Glossip majority’s confidence in the State was subsequently tested 
in the planning and logistics of the next execution. It will be determined 
whether the improvements to Oklahoma’s execution protocol would render 
a constitutional punishment. Justice Sotomayor, along with Justices 
Ginsberg, Breyer, and Kagan, were unconfident about this possibility. 
Evaluating subsequent events in Oklahoma the minority sentiment was 
clearly justified. 
VII. Almost a Postscript: Human Error and 
the Unfinal Decision Post-Glossip 
A. The Stay of Richard Glossip’s Execution: Negligence, But Not as Was 
Envisaged 
After the Supreme Court denied Glossip relief, Oklahoma initiated 
proceedings to judicially put him to death. From the State’s position the 
comity interests had been adequately fulfilled and legitimate finality could 
now be initiated in the execution. A manifestation of human error occurred, 
however, that was not envisaged previously in the Warner-Glossip 
litigation. It was not the possibility of negligence regarding the use and 
biological effect of midazolam—it was an act of negligence in the 
pharmacist proscribing “potassium acetate” instead of “potassium 
chloride,” and the Department’s chain of possession criteria failing to 
identify the error until the moment of the preparations for the execution.343 
Thus, Governor Mary Fallin issued an Executive Order halting the 
execution,344 and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals then granted a 
stay on October 2, 2015.345 On October 16, 2015, the district court declared 
Richard Glossip’s case to be “administratively closed”346 and held that it 
                                                                                                                 
 343. See Okla. Exec. Dep’t, Okla. Exec. Order No. 2015-42 (Sept. 30, 2015) (“This stay 
is ordered due to the Department of Corrections having received potassium acetate as drug 
number three for the three-drug protocol.”). Scott Pruitt, the Attorney General of Oklahoma, 
argued that “the Office of the Attorney General needs time to evaluate the events that 
transpired on September 30, 2015, ODOC’s acquisition of a drug contrary to protocol, and 
ODOC’s internal procedures relative to the protocol. The State has a strong interest in 
ensuring that the execution protocol is strictly followed.” State’s Notice and Request for 
Stay of Execution Dates at 2, Glossip v. Oklahoma, Nos. D-2005-310 (Glossip), D-2000-653 
(Grant), D-2004-1260 (Cole) (Okla. Crim. App. Oct. 1, 2015).  
 344. Okla. Exec. Dep’t, Okla. Exec. Order No. 2015-42 (Sept. 30, 2015).  
 345. Order Issuing Stay at 2, Glossip v. Oklahoma, Nos. D-2005-310, D-2000-653, D-
2004-1260 (Okla. Crim. App. Oct. 2, 2015).  
 346. Order Granting Joint Stipulation at 2, Glossip v. Gross, No. CIV-14-665-F (W.D. 
Okla. Oct. 16, 2015).  
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would not be in the “interests of judicial economy and comity” for 
Oklahoma to seek an execution at this time.347  
Here, we see a transparent review of the logistics of Oklahoma’s 
execution protocol, and the initiation of comity interests to suspend the 
finality of an execution. To fulfill the “interests of judicial economy and 
comity,” a grand jury review commenced from October 2015348 through 
May 2016.349 Then on May 31, 2016, the Status Report noted that the 
Fifteenth Multicounty Grand Jury issued its findings350 and concluded that 
the “Department of Corrections staff, and others participating in the 
execution process, failed to perform their duties with the precision and 
attention to detail the exercise of state authority in such cases demands,”351 
and “[t]his investigation has revealed that most Department employees 
profoundly misunderstood the Protocol.”352 Hence, there was a systematic 
failure to ensure the constitutionality of Oklahoma’s execution process, and 
based on these adverse incidents, and in an expression of finality interests, 
the Multicounty Grand Jury concluded that “justice has been delayed for 
the victims’ families and the citizens of Oklahoma, and confidence further 
shaken in the ability of this State to carry out the death penalty.”353 
New issues of comity and finality have surfaced following the Supreme 
Court’s Glossip ruling, demonstrating that the overall confidence in the 
                                                                                                                 
 347. Id. (stating that “[i]t would be in the interests of judicial economy and comity for the 
Oklahoma Attorney General not to seek an execution date” until the investigations into the 
protocol had concluded and the results reviewed, and any amendments to the protocol 
provided (emphasis added)). 
 348. Status Report at 2-3, Glossip v. Oklahoma, Nos. D-2005-310 (Glossip), D-2000-653 
(Grant), D-2004-1260 (Cole) (Okla. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2015).  
 349. Status Report at 1, Glossip v. Oklahoma, Nos. D-2005-310 (Glossip), D-2000-653 
(Grant), D-2004-1260 (Cole), D-1996-121 (Fairchild), D-2006-38 (Williams) (Okla. Crim. 
App. May 17, 2016).  
 350. Status Report at 1, Glossip v. Oklahoma, Nos. D-2005-310 (Glossip), D-2000-653 
(Grant), D-2004-1260 (Cole), D-1996-121 (Fairchild), D-2006-338 (Williams) (Okla. Crim. 
App. May. 31, 2016). After the Fifteenth Multicounty Grand Jury issued its report setting out 
its findings, another updated Status Report referenced the jury report and noted: “The report 
made recommendations which must be reviewed, considered and, if deemed necessary, 
implemented by the Department of Corrections. Thus, although the investigation is 
complete, it is still not the appropriate time to set an execution date.” Status Report at 2, 
Glossip v. Oklahoma, Nos. D-2005-310 (Glossip), D-2000-653 (Grant), D-2004-1260 
(Cole), D-1996-121 (Fairchild), D-2006-338 (Williams), D-2006-126 (Hanson) (Okla. Crim. 
App. June 30, 2016). 
 351. Interim Report Number 14, supra note 5, at 1.  
 352. Id. at 105.  
 353. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).  
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state’s execution protocol was in many ways based upon illusory 
determinations. Due to the Multicounty Grand Jury investigations, it is no 
longer a foregone conclusion that Oklahoma can initiate effective comity 
review to create a constitutional execution. Furthermore, the investigations 
have brought to light that even in the previous execution of Charles Warner, 
there are now significant factors questioning the constitutionality of his 
execution as instead of potassium chloride, potassium acetate, a drug not 
included in the execution protocol, was wrongly provided and wrongly 
used. Warner’s execution may now be regarded as an illegitimate 
application of finality in the death penalty. 
B. The False Comity and Illegitimate Finality in Charles Warner’s 
Execution 
The investigations into the failings of the logistical preparations for 
Richard Glossip’s execution uncovered that there was also hitherto 
unknown negligence in the preceding execution of Charles Warner. Before 
the execution of Warner, his attorneys were supplied with a notice from the 
Department that the three-drug protocol of Chart D (midazolam, 
vecuronium bromide, and potassium chloride) would be used in his 
execution on January 15, 2015.354 On the day of Warner’s execution, an 
anonymized “Warden A” opened the box but did not realize that the wrong 
potassium had been ordered and sent by the pharmacist.355 Although the 
vials had “potassium acetate” written on them, the various members of the 
Department’s execution teams did not notice that this drug was not 
mandated within the execution protocol.356 Warner’s execution began at 
7:10 p.m., and he was pronounced dead at 7:28 p.m.357  
                                                                                                                 
 354. Id. at 30. “[T]he chain of custody form contains the Pharmacist’s name, the 
receiving party’s name, the date and time the drugs were received, and the drug’s storage 
location upon receipt,” but the form did not contain any information on the contents of the 
drugs. Id. at 31-32.  
 355. See id. at 33. The pharmacist explained to the Grand Jury:  
When I looked through the ordering system, I looked at potassium. . . .I did not 
look at the salt form like I should have. In my pharmacy, my – in my brain, the 
potassiums are interchangeable. They’re not generic. . . . but in a setting that 
they’re used in, potassium is the drug that we’re looking for. I did not look 
close enough and look at the acetate or chloride. I was looking at potassium. 
Id. at 27-28.  
 356. Id. at 33-36. In responding to questions before the Grand Jury, the IV Team Leader 
stated:  
All I can conjecture is that this was my first foray into this very unusual world 
of executions, lethal injections. And as you can imagine, my anxiety level was 
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Following the execution, a full inventory was taken of the drugs, the 
empty vials were stored, and an “After-Action Review” was held with the 
Director, the IV Team, the Restraint Team, and the Special Operations 
Team.358 At the briefing “no concerns were expressed regarding the 
execution drugs utilized.”359 Members of Oklahoma’s Chief Medical 
Examiner’s Office (“OCME”), then provided Charles Warner’s body and 
the drugs used for the autopsy report, which included photographs of the 
empty vials and syringes.360 In the autopsy report, the OCME noted that 
what was submitted with Warner’s body included a “[w]hite box containing 
12 empty vials labelled ’20 mL single dose Potassium Acetate 
Injection.’”361 The OCME employees stated that they were not familiar 
with the specifics of Chart D drugs and had no reason to know the legal 
procedures in this specific execution.362 
Upon completion of an execution, the Department’s Division Manager 
for Field Support is tasked with conducting a Quality Assurance Review to 
evaluate the performance of the execution process, and to report his 
findings to the Director.363 The report did not pick up on the use of 
“potassium acetate,” as opposed to “potassium chloride,” so the Division 
Manager did not record any of the failings in the chain of custody of the 
execution drugs.364 The Warner Autopsy Report was then circulated to 
various employees of the Department of Corrections, who along with the 
Office of the Governor, did not observe the reference in the report of the 
use of the “Potassium Acetate Injection.’”365 In March and April 2015, as 
part of the investigations and litigation into Glossip’s case, the Attorney 
General’s Solicitor General’s Unit, the Litigation Unit, and the Federal 
Public Defender’s Office received a copy of the autopsy report, but the use 
                                                                                                                 
significant . . . . the high stress environment is not new to me, but this was very 
unique and very unusual. Id. at 36. 
 357. Id. at 38-40.  
 358. See id. at 42-44.  
 359. Id. at 44.  
 360. See id. at 42-43. 
 361. Id. at 46-47 (emphasis added). 
 362. Id. at 47. 
 363. Id. at 49.  
 364. See id. at 49-51 (noting that “[a]lthough the Division Manager for Field Support had 
a PhD in clinical psychology, he had no specialized training in conducting quality assurance 
reviews of executions”).  
 365. Id. at 53. 
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of potassium acetate was not discovered at this point.366 A contributory 
factor was that the litigation at this time was intensely focused on the 
constitutionality of midazolam and its appropriateness for use as an 
anesthetic in the execution, rather than on the fact that potassium chloride 
and not potassium acetate was designated as the third drug within Chart 
D.367 
C. The New Negligence in the Execution Procedure for Richard Glossip 
In preparation for Richard Glossip’s execution, the Office of the 
Attorney General’s Litigation Unit notified Glossip’s lawyers that the 
Department would use the drugs in Chart D.368 Following the same chain of 
custody that was used in the Warner execution, the anonymized “Warden 
A” unpacked the drugs and photographed them.369 This time he noticed the 
vials stated “potassium acetate,” but he did not notify any of the execution 
teams that the drug was not the one classified in Chart D.370 Warden A 
assumed that the drugs had previously been checked and therefore 
proceeded with the execution.371 When the IV Team Leader was drawing 
up the syringes he likewise noticed that some of the vials were labelled 
potassium acetate, but in deviating from the practice of Warden A, the 
Leader made the decision to notify the Department of Correction’s General 
Counsel.372  
The Attorney General’s Office advised that the execution should not 
proceed if potassium chloride, the drug explicitly referred to in Chart D, 
                                                                                                                 
 366. Id. at 54-55. It was decided that the Director of the DoC had orally modified the 
execution protocol with authority. See id. at 82-83. An agent with the Department’s Office 
of Inspector General (“OIG Agent 1”) failed to inspect the execution drugs while 
transporting them to the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, and Warden A failed to notify anyone 
in the Department that potassium acetate had been received. Id. at 57-58. The IV Team 
failed to observe the Department had received the wrong execution drugs. The Department’s 
Execution Protocol failed to define important terms, and lacked controls to ensure the proper 
execution drugs were obtained and administered. See id. at 84-85. 
 367. Id. at 56-57. 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id. at 58. 
 370. Id. at 58-59. Before the Grand Jury, “Warden A,” stated: 
I didn’t know who ordered the drugs. That’s not part of my job duty. I didn’t 
know it hadn’t been looked at, I assumed it had been. I assumed that what the 
pharmacist provided was what [sic] we needed. So in my mind, that potassium 
acetate must have been the same thing as potassium chloride. 
Id. at 59.  
 371. Id. at 59.  
 372. Id. at 63-64.  
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was not available.373 Governor Fallin was informed of the current legal 
position, and issued “Executive Order 2015-42, granting Glossip a thirty-
seven day stay of execution.”374 The Office of the Governor put out a press 
release entitled, “Questions and Answers regarding Richard Glossip’s stay 
of execution,” which stated:  
The decision to delay the execution was made because of the 
legal ambiguity surrounding the use of potassium acetate. Out of 
an abundance of caution and acting on the advice of the attorney 
general and her legal staff, Gov. Fallin delayed Glossip’s 
execution so any legal ambiguities could be addressed.375  
The Office of the Attorney General then filed a Notice and Request for 
Stay of Execution on October 1, arguing that it needed “‘time to evaluate 
the events that transpired on September 30, 2015, the Department’s 
acquisition of a drug contrary to protocol, and the Department’s internal 
procedures relative to the protocol’ due to the State’s ‘strong interest in 
ensuring that the Execution Protocol is strictly followed.’”376 In this 
suspension of the finality of the execution, the State of Oklahoma initiated 
further review.  
Following the submission of the Multicounty Grand Jury’s Interim 
Report, three key issues have emerged: (a) there was an unjustifiable oral 
change of the protocol to attempt to complete the execution;377 (b) there 
was a systematic failure of the staff of the Department of Corrections;378 
and (c) in the attempt to prevent future problems and facilitate the 
Department staff’s adherence of the protocol,379 the Governor introduced 
initiatives for the Oklahoma State Penitentiary to obtained a license to store 
the drugs used in the execution protocol.380 This license is an attempt to 
rectify the issues preventing the obtaining of correct drugs.  
                                                                                                                 
 373. Id. at 66.  
 374. Id. at 69.  
 375. Id. at 72-73 (emphasis added).  
 376. Id. at 73.  
 377. Id. at 82-83. 
 378. Id. at 74-75. 
 379. Id. at 100-06.  
 380. Whilst the Grand Jury was conducting its investigations, to help promote comity and 
finality, the governor identified a key problem to be rectified. Of issue was that controlled 
dangerous substances (“CDS”) are regulated in the State of Oklahoma within a dual-
registration process by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) and the Oklahoma 
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (“OBNDD”). Id. at 18. Up until the date of the 
proposed Glossip execution, the Oklahoma Department of Corrections did not have a 
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The grand jury found that the execution protocol had been illegitimately 
changed by the Director and the Governor’s General Counsel.381 The 
Governor’s General Counsel testified to the grand jury that even though he 
had learned that the pharmacist supplied the wrong potassium, his 
recommendation was to “proceed with Glossip’s execution, and then seek 
‘clarification on the protocol’ prior to the next execution.”382 This action is 
indicative of the promotion of the State’s finality interest in rendering an 
execution, but in this instance, it was illegitimately applied and extra-
legally pursued. The actions of the Governor’s General Counsel clashed 
with Glossip’s finality interest in protecting his rights to only have imposed 
upon him constitutional punishment, resulting in a suspension of the 
execution in a recognition of the need for further comity review. It is clear 
that the pressure on the system can cause decisions to be made that are not 
sanctioned by the execution protocol.  
This pressure, which contributes to unjustifiable decisions, was 
compounded by the recent history of the increased difficulties in obtaining 
appropriate execution drugs.383 The Department’s General Counsel noted 
that the pharmacy which supplied the drugs for the Lockett execution 
“refused to continue to participate in future executions.”384 The Office of 
                                                                                                                 
registered license with the OBNDD to store CDS’s at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, and 
so CDS had to be transferred to the Penitentiary on the day of an execution. See id. at 18-21. 
This caused comity and finality problems, which are engaged with above, but on April 19, 
2016, Governor Fallin signed Senate Bill 884 which came into effect on November 1, 2016, 
allowing the Department to register with OBNDD. It enables the Department to allow OSP 
to store CDS’s to be used in executions. Id. at 21.  
 381. Id. at 67, 82-83.  
 382. Id. at 67. The Interim Report noted that on “the interchangeability of potassium 
chloride and potassium acetate, the Pharmacist explained to the Grand Jury that the active 
ingredient” was potassium ion and that the difference is that “[c]hloride and acetate are two 
types of salts to which the potassium ion attaches.” Id. at 27. Thus, the active ingredient is 
the same (potassium) and it is still evident, following the Warner execution, that death 
occurs. See id. The question then comes whether the Execution Protocol allows “potassium 
acetate” to be used instead of the designated “potassium chloride” in Chart D.  
 383. Id. at 76 (“The Department’s General Counsel explained that qualified doctors are 
often unwilling to assist or are prohibited from assisting in executions due to their medical 
ethics and professional societies’ rules, even banning certain types of doctors from even 
being present at executions. Further, obtaining proper drugs from pharmacies has become 
increasingly difficult since pharmaceutical companies are limiting their supplies of lethal 
injection drugs, and pharmacies themselves are often unwilling to supply drugs to the 
Department due to privacy and safety concerns.” (footnote omitted)).  
 384. Id. at 22 n.115. There is a growing moral and professional bulwark against 
healthcare professionals participating in executions. See generally Litton, supra note 107 
(discussing the ethical assessments with physicians and executions).  
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the Attorney General revealed that it could not obtain pentobarbital and this 
was the reason for clarifying the use of the drugs in Chart D (which 
included midazolam).385 However, these reasons do not mitigate or render 
justifiable the actions of the Governor’s General Counsel, as the 
Multicounty Grand Jury’s Interim Report concluded:  
It is unacceptable for the Governor’s General Counsel to so 
flippantly and recklessly disregard the written Protocol and the 
rights of Richard Glossip. Given the gravity of the death penalty, 
as well as the national scrutiny following the Lockett execution, 
the Governor’s Counsel should have been unwilling to take such 
chances. Regardless of the fact the wrong drug was used to 
execute Warner, the Governor’s Counsel should have 
resoundingly recommended an immediate stay of execution to 
allow time to locate potassium chloride.386  
This attempt to orally change the execution protocol unintentionally 
wove together the assessment of the unknown biological effects of an 
injection of potassium acetate with the assessment of the unknown effects 
of the injection of 500mg of midazolam. What is currently maintained is the 
possibility of creating the inmate in the guise of a death row version of 
“Schrödinger’s Cat.”387 The district court’s evidentiary hearing and the 
Multicounty Grand Jury’s deliberations on the human error in using 
potassium acetate demonstrate the danger that the physiology of death by 
execution can ultimately produce an opaque phenomenon in which there 
will be a superposition of coexisting possibilities—that the inmate strapped 
to the gurney will have his Eighth Amendment rights both protected and 
violated. Just as we do not know if Erwin Schrödinger’s cat is dead or alive 
                                                                                                                 
 385. Interim Report Number 14, supra note 5, at 22 (“The first pharmacist contacted 
refused, the second agreed to provide execution drugs but could not get pentobarbital, and 
the others also could not obtain pentobarbital. As a result, the Department decided to utilize 
Chart D of the Execution Protocol instead.” (footnote omitted)).  
 386. Id. at 100.  
 387. Erwin Schrödinger created a thought experiment to solve the problem of the 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, and identified the paradox of a physical 
state of simultaneous existence. Joseph Blocher, Schrödinger’s Cross: The Quantum 
Mechanics of the Establishment Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 51, 51-53 (2010). This 
theory has been applied to legal norms. See Barbara Yngvesson & Susan Coutin, 
Schrödinger’s Cat and the Ethnography of Law, 31 POLAR: POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
REV. 61 (2008); John D. Briggs, Schrödinger’s Cat and Extraterritoriality, 29 ANTITRUST 79 
(2014); Derek E. Bambauer, Schrödinger’s Cybersecurity, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 791 
(2015).  
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss4/1
2017]        OKLAHOMA’S LETHAL INJECTION PROTOCOL 619 
 
 
unless we lift the lid and take a look inside the box, we do not know to a 
reasonable level of scientific certainty whether the administration of 
midazolam and (if the Director and the Governor’s General Counsel had 
gotten their way) potassium acetate, works in the way mandated by 
constitutional punishment until an autopsy report of the dead inmate can 
reveal what happened in his blood stream and internal organs.  
If an execution is proven ex post facto to be torturous (as needless 
suffering was imposed) it is unconstitutional, and thus an illegitimate 
manifestation of finality has occurred (as in Warner’s execution). This post-
punishment revelation, however, does not help the inmate as he or she will 
already be dead. Indeed, the former Supreme Court Justice John Paul 
Stevens argued that “the finality of state action terminating the life of one 
of its citizens precludes any possible redress if a mistake does occur.”388 
Such presence of uncertainty, and thus the need for an ex post facto 
investigation, is unacceptable as a principle of Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence and human dignity in punishment. Although the risk of the 
unknown for the existence of the superposition may be a legitimate basis 
for a hypothesis in physics for determining quantum theory, that risk in 
lethal injection procedure is unacceptable as a principle of humane 
punishment. We need to do better than that. And if we cannot, we need to 
admit it and discontinue this punishment. 
VIII. Conclusion: The Interaction of Comity and Finality to Reveal the 
Irredeemable Constitutional Deficiencies of the Death Penalty in Oklahoma 
This critique has placed the consideration of Oklahoma’s execution 
protocol in the Warner-Glossip litigation within two methods of assessment 
to uncover the reasons for the human error and the lack of confidence in the 
state being able to maintain a humane lethal injection process. The methods 
presented were (a) the procedural review provided within the principles of 
comity and finality and (b) the scientific methodologies of atomism and 
holism for determining the epistemology of the pharmacology. These 
methods were used to provide a critique of the adjudicative assessment by 
the district court, the Tenth Circuit, and the Supreme Court so as to uncover 
the extent to which accurate data and methodologies were used in 
compliance or in violation of the FRE and Daubert standards of review. 
Then following further examples of human error in the execution protocol, 
the Multicounty Grand Jury’s investigations were analyzed to consider the 
                                                                                                                 
 388. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE THE 
CONSTITUTION 122 (2014).  
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questions concerning the maladministration of various members of the 
execution teams. The grand jury also reflected both comity and finality 
assessments in not only its procedural review but also in its search for the 
epistemology in the pharmacology for executions.   
The above analysis has attempted to demonstrate that the State of 
Oklahoma, and the federal adjudicative process, has failed in the 
consideration of Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol. Sound scientific 
methodology and data has not been provided to affirm the claimed 
legitimacy of Oklahoma’s use of midazolam in the protocol. It has been 
argued that the judicial system—from the district court to the Supreme 
Court—misapplied the comity and finality principles and unjustifiably 
sidelined sound science in providing a packaged, policy-driven outcome of 
the methodology and data. This occurred through a judicial management 
that protected the State’s atomistic viewpoints on the science, to the 
detriment of sound pharmacology through holistic methodology. 
Consequently, torturous executions will be maintained, and the evidence of 
Drs. Lubarsky and Sasich, and of the sixteen litigant-neutral 
pharmacologists, clearly demonstrate that midazolam will not work in the 
way that the State claims. This is because the drug (a) has a ceiling effect, 
making it ineffective as an anesthetic in the execution; (b) does not have 
sufficient analgesic properties, resulting in the inmate’s experience of an 
enhanced pain sensation (needless suffering); and (c) will very likely induce 
paradoxical manifestations resulting in the drug not producing its intended 
effects. It is most unsatisfactory in the presence of such overwhelming 
scientific evidence that the State of Oklahoma was allowed to maintain this 
drug within its execution protocol. 
The governmental confidence in Oklahoma’s capital judicial system—
following the creation of the new execution facility, the enhanced execution 
procedures to eradicate human error, and the array of drug options in Charts 
A-D—should now be seen as unfounded. The negligence of the prison 
obtaining potassium acetate instead of potassium chloride, the use of this 
wrong drug in Charles Warner’s execution, and the attempted use of it in 
Richard Glossip’s execution, was the result of an illegitimate oral change in 
the execution protocol. Following this unconscionable event, Governor 
Fallin made a commendable decision to impose a detailed comity review of 
Oklahoma’s execution protocol. The subsequent Multicounty Grand Jury 
affirmed the presence of human error and the unsanctioned oral change of 
the protocol. A logical conclusion can be drawn from the review, revealing 
that in the execution protocol, after forty years of experimentation (since 
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the invention of lethal injection in 1977), it is very likely that future human 
error will occur and even manifest in hitherto undiscovered ways. 
In Baze v. Rees, Justice Stevens stated that the death penalty was a 
product of “habit and inattention rather than an acceptable deliberative 
process.”389 It is clear that Oklahoma reflects this damning inattention and 
thus maintains an unacceptable mode of punishment. We are at a moment 
in the history of the death penalty where we can say that the comity 
interests expressed in the capital judicial system will consistently 
demonstrate to the state-federal architecture that the death penalty is an 
unconstitutional punishment. The transparency offered by a detailed review 
will reveal that the death penalty is an illegitimate manifestation of finality, 
and thus should be found to be an unconstitutional punishment. We are now 
living in a moment in which the death penalty should be considered per se 
cruel and unusual punishment. The death penalty is a barbaric vestige of a 
bygone era, and it should be castigated to the historical annals of the State 
of Oklahoma. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 389. 553 U.S. 35, 78 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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